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ABSTRACT

As climate change leads to both internal displacement and
mass migrations, we need not only new places for people to live
but also new locations for infrastructure projects and other public
needs. Some of the most attractive areas for these new land uses
are currently unoccupied land, including land set aside for
conservation. Numerous laws restrict the availability and possible
uses of public conservation land. Individual agreements and
property restrictions encumber private conservation land, varying

in the ease with which the restrictions can be modified. For
example, privately protected areas in the United States are often
encumbered with perpetual conservation easements. The rigid
rules of such protected areas combined with the increased number
of private interests involved make them legally unattractive for
land-use change even when they might be socially desirable
locations for settlement. This Article examines opportunities and
constraints for expanded use of conservation lands to meet climate
*
Professor, University of Miami, School of Law. I am grateful to the participants
at the Climate Migration, Displacement, and Relocation Conference in Honolulu in
December 2016 for sharing their research and experiences. A particular thanks to Maxine
Burkett and Alexander Zahar for their thoughtful comments on an early version of this
piece. I also benefited from the comments of colleagues at the University of Miami and the
2019 Southeastern Environmental Law Scholars workshop. My work in this area is
continually being updated and improved through interactions with the "On the Move"
climate migration research group at UM (Xavier Cortada, Katharine Mach, and Ian
Wright). Part of this piece was written while I was a visiting professor at the Universidad
Pontificia Comillas (ICADE) in Madrid, Spain, and I am thankful for their support.
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migrant needs. I explore how these areas could respond to needs
that develop in the context of climate change migration and
illustrate the dangers of overly rigid land-use laws. Policymakers
and conservationists should consider these tensions when drafting
agreements and laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the position of some politicians, there is no doubt
among scientists that climate change is a reality whose impacts
are already being experienced. 1 To many people, the debate over
the details of climate science is immaterial. They are already
feeling the effects of climate change in dramatic ways. In Africa, 2
the Arctic, 3 the Pacific, 4 the Gulf Coast,5 and many other parts of
the globe, negative impacts of climate change are forcing people
from their homes. Others may not yet be experiencing the impacts,
but instead of denying that changes are likely to occur, they are

1.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE
2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (Core Writing Team, Rajendra K.

Pachauri & Leo Meyer eds., 2015), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SYR_A
R5_FINALfull.pdf [https://perma.cc/84R2-YSKK] [hereinafter IPCC 2014 SYNTHESIS
REPORT]. Roughly every five to seven years, the IPCC publishes an assessment of the state
of climate change science. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THE IPCC
AND THE SIXTH ASSESSMENT CYCLE (2020), https://www.ipcc.chlsite/assets/uploads/2020/05/

2020-AC6_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/64P9-E3DB]. The IPCC published its most recent
assessment report in 2014, and as the fifth such effort, it is known as AR5. Reports,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.ipcc.ch/reports/ [https://pe

&

rma.cc/998V-NHU7] (last visited Oct. 21, 2020). The next synthesis report is expected in
June 2022. AR6 Synthesis Report: Climate Change 2020, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-cycle/ [https://perm
a.cc/5JLZ-R7HR] (last visited June 23, 2020). The synthesis of the hundreds of pages of
scientific findings in AR5 concludes that "[h]uman influence on the climate system is clear,
and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent
climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems." IPCC 2014
SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra at 2. Specifically, the report observes that global warming is
"unequivocal." Id. The IPCC issued a special report on global warming of 1.5*C in 2018.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5*C (2018),
http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spmfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S6Z-CS9P] [hereinafter
IPCC GLOBAL WARMING]; see also J.S. Carlton, Rebecca Perry-Hill, Matthew Huber
Linda S. Prokopy, The Climate Change Consensus Extends Beyond Climate Scientists, 10
ENV'T RSCH. LETTERS, no. 094025, 2015, at 1, 7-8, http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/10/9/
094025 [https://perma.cc/R5KD-Z75E] (demonstrating a consensus among scientists that
anthropogenic climate change exists even while media and politicians express skepticism).
2.
Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Africa's Climate Crisis, Conflict, and MigrationChallenges,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/09/20/a
fricas-climate-crisis-conflict-and-migration-challenges/
[https://perma.cc/45NG-GEUF
(describing the northward movement of people from West Africa).
3.
Lawrence C. Hamilton, Kei Saito, Philip A. Loring, Richard B. Lammers & Henry
P. Huntington, Climigration? Population and Climate Change in Arctic Alaska, 38
POPULATION & ENV'T 115, 122-25 (2016) (showing patterns of movement in native Alaskan
villages).
4.
JOHN CAMPBELL & OLIVIA WARRICK, UNITED NATIONS ECON. & SOC. COMM'N FOR
ASIA & THE PAC., CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE PACIFIC 7 (2014),

https://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/docs/261/Pacific.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCK6-KSCR].
5.
Oh Brown, Migrationand Climate Change, in IOM MIGRATION RESEARCH SERIES
12 (Int'l Org. Migration, Migration Rsch. Ser. No. 31, 2008), https://www.ipcc.ch/apps/njlite/
srex/njlite-download.php?id=5866 [https://perma.cc/9VFM-WH32].
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beginning to plan their responses. Members of Native Alaskan
6
Villages are voting to move their entire populations. The U.S.
7
government is funding community relocation efforts in Louisiana.
Outside the United States, there are widespread reports of
impacts and relocations. The people of Kiribati are slowing buying
9
up land in Fiji8 and trying to physically elevate their island. Other
Pacific island nations are developing their own migration
strategies. 10 This is occurring alongside large-scale migrations of
people and animals in countries like Bangladesh and Kenya where
11
the climate change impacts are also acute.
There is an undeniable link between climate change impacts
and migration. Climate change is expected to contribute to
increased movements of people. 12 The Environmental Justice
Foundation predicts climate change will displace 150 million
Annie Weyiouanna, Panelist at the Symposium on Climate Displacement,
6.
Migration, and Relocation: Community Perspectives on the Impacts of Climate Change
(Dec. 13, 2016); see also Peyton Jaffe, Relocation of Native Alaskan Communities, ARCGIS
6
STORYMAPS (Dec. 11, 2019), https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/b2fCf6f2c9O24114ad dbcO
909ea7988 [https://perma.ccfUW88-LXFG]. The village of Shishmaref is under severe
threat from climate change and is literally falling into the Chukchi Sea. A majority of the
villagers voted to move their entire community a few miles inland (to protect the unique
language and culture of the Inupiat Indians) hoping to ward off an eventual forced
relocation to Anchorage or Nome where the community would be scattered. Merrit
Kennedy, Threatened by Rising Seas, Alaska Village Decides to Relocate, 9NPR (Aug. 18,
2016, 7:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/18/49051 540/threatene
d-by-rising-seas-an-alaskan-village-decides-to-relocate [https://perma.cc/8JHT-LPLF].
Coral Davenport & Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American 'Climate
7.
Refugees,' N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettlingU.S.
The
[https://perma.cc/V2JA-XBHU].
the-first-american-climate-refugees.html
Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a $48 million grant to Isle de Jean
Charles, Louisiana to relocate the entire community, as it is struggling with climate change
impacts. In 2016, the Isle de Jean Charles community of Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw
Indians became the first community in the United States to be moved by the federal
government based on climate change implications. Id.
Laurence Caramel, Besieged by the Rising Tides of Climate Change, Kiribati Buys
8.
GUARDIAN (June 30, 2014, 8:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.comlenvironme
Fiji,
in
Land
nt/2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-vanua-levu [https://perma.cc/JA7X-7W58].
Christopher Pala, Kiribati's President's Plan to Raise Islands in Fight Against
9.
Sea-Level Rise, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2020, 10:02 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/20
20/aug/10/kiribatis-presidents-plans-to-raise-islands-in-fight-against-sea-level-rise [https:/
/perma.cc/V3MV-CUK6].
Colette Mortreux & Jon Barnett, Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in
10.
Funafuti, Tuvalu, 19 GLOB. ENV'T CHANGE 105, 105-06 (2009).
Richard Black, Stephen R. G. Bennett, Sandy M. Thomas & John R. Beddington,
11.
Migration as Adaptation, 478 NATURE 447, 448 (2011); ENV'T JUST. FOUND., A NATION
UNDER THREAT: THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FORCED
MIGRATION IN BANGLADESH 8 (2012).
DEV.,
INT'L
FOR
AGENCY
SCHUYLER NULL & LAUREN HERZER RISI, U.S.
12.
NAVIGATING COMPLEXITY: CLIMATE, MIGRATION, AND CONFLICT IN A CHANGING WORLD 4

(2016).
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people by 2050,13 while others predict this figure to be much
greater. 14 Climate change hits hardest at the poorest countries and
the poorest people within those countries. 15 The link between
climate change and migration may be particularly important for
society to tackle because of its intertwining with conflict and
violence. 16 Climate change migration will influence the form and
location of violent conflicts as the movement of people changes
resource constraints and introduces cultural conflicts. 17
Because of the challenges and opportunities that accompany
relocation of climate migrants, this Article explores ways to ease
the process. Specifically, this Article explores places where
relocation occurs, with a close examination of the role conservation
lands play. Conservation lands have often suffered encroachments
and intensification of use when other lands become more marginal
or as populations grow. 18 My investigation involves looking both at
the impact of such relocations on conserved areas and the obstacle
to relocation that conservation rules might impose. This doubleedged sword creates a moral conundrum. The impacts of climate
change mean that conservation lands will be of heightened
importance while also serving as attractive spots for relocation of
humans, nonhumans, and infrastructure.
Relocation to
conservation

lands,

however,

could

heighten environmental

stressors and create negative feedback loops that worsen
environmental conditions and pressures to relocate. This Article
examines the legal obstacles (or lack thereof) to using conservation
lands as receptors of new users and uses. While the phenomenon
occurs worldwide, this Article examines laws and lands within the
13.

ENV'T JUST. FOUND., NO PLACE LIKE

HOME: WHERE NEXT FOR CLIMATE

REFUGEES? 14 (2009).
14.
Brown, supra note 5, at 11 (placing the number of climate refugees at 200 million
people and describing it as originating from analyst Norman Myers of Oxford University).
15.

WORLD

BANK

GRP.,

GROUNDSWELL:

PREPARING

FOR

INTERNAL

CLIMATE

MIGRATION, at xxi (2018) (suggesting over 143 million people will be displaced by climate
change by 2050).
16.
Katharine J. Mach, Caroline M. Kraan, W. Neil Adger, Halvard Buhaug,
Marshall Burke, James D. Fearon, Christopher B. Field, Cullen S. Hendrix, Jean-Francois
Maystadt, John O'Loughlin, Philip Roessler, Jurgen Scheffran, Kenneth A. Schultz & Nina
von Uexkull, Climate as a Risk Factorfor Armed Conflict, 571 NATURE 193, 193 (2019).
17.
NULL & HERZER RISI, supra note 12, at 5.
18.
Alisa A. Wade & David M. Theobald, ResidentialDevelopment Encroachment on
U.S. Protected Areas, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 151, 157-58 (2010); Leona K. Svancara,
J. Michael Scott, Thomas R. Loveland & Anna B. Pidgorna, Assessing the Landscape
Context and Conversion Risk of ProtectedAreas Using SatelliteData Products, 113 REMOTE
SENSING ENV'T 1357, 1362 (2009); George Wittemyer, Paul Elsen, William T. Bean, A.
Coleman O. Burton & Justin S. Brashares, Accelerated Human Population Growth at
ProtectedArea Edges, 321 SCIENCE 123, 125 (2008).
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United States. Such a focus is increasingly salient as other
countries model their land conservation legal regimes on U.S.
concepts.19

Exploration of these questions requires understanding the
types of movements occurring. Therefore, Part II presents
examples of climate change relocations. The examples highlight
the challenges involved in relocation, including consideration of
where people are moving. Part III briefly discusses the types of
land most likely to come under pressure from relocation. Homing
in on conservation lands, the heart of this Article examines the
property and land-use rules on conservation lands in the United
States, discussing which lands are likely places of relocation and
exploring what rules could either hamper or facilitate movement
of people.
Land conservation is an important public policy goal, but we
must confront the social and ecological struggles of climate change
and consider a program that helps us best satisfy competing but
equally laudable policy goals. This Article does not detail how
communities should balance the policy goal of accommodating
climate change adaptation and land conservation but instead
details what land-use restrictions might serve as impediments to
meet social goals (or alternatively serve to protect them). With a
fuller understanding of the pressures of climate migration and the
limitations on shifting land uses, government agencies and
community members can have a more informed decision-making
and priority-setting process in climate planning. I encourage state

and local governments (along with interested NGOs) to think
carefully about how they structure conservation land restrictions
and how courts might approach conservation and relocation
disputes. Specifically, a shift away from the most rigid definitions
and tools for conservation lands is more likely to accommodate
climate adaptation that includes migration. Yet, increasing
flexibility to accommodate climate migrants may put conservation
lands at risk of deterioration. In the final analysis, however,
people, plants, and animals will be moving. Denying climate
migration is no more fruitful from a policy perspective than

denying climate change. Planning sensibly for climate migrants

See, e.g., ANA BARREIRA L6PEZ, MYRIAM RODRiGUEZ-GUERRA, IGNASI PUIG
19.
VENTOSA & PEDRO BRUFAO CURIEL, ESTUDIO JURIDICO SOBRE LA CUSTODIA DEL
TERRITORIO: PLATAFORMA DE CUSTODIA DEL TERRITORIO DE LA FUNDACI6N BIODIVERSIDAD
23-24 (2010) (discussing Spain); RUPERT WATSON, KATHLEEN FITZGERALD & NYOKABI
GITAHI, EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR HABITAT CONSERVATION OUTSIDE PROTECTED AREAS IN
KENYA: THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL EASEMENTS 9 (2010) (discussing Kenya).
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will likely have greater environmental benefit in the long run than

making strict prohibitions. Ignoring this problem is likely to lead
to chaotic migration, putting greater pressures on open land and
constraining resources.
II. CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT, RELOCATION, AND MIGRATION

A.

Slow-Onset and Rapid-Onset Climate Impacts

Understanding how people move in response to climate
change means understanding two types of change: slow-onset
changes (chronic hazards) and rapid-onset changes (extreme
episodic disasters). While climate change impacts are complicated,
most fall into one of these two categories. Researchers have ably
detailed the potential impacts of climate change that motivate
people to leave their homes. 20 The paragraphs below provide
examples, not comprehensive assessments.

Slow-onset climate change impacts are many and varied.
They can include things like a gradual spread of diseases (for
humans or other species), 21 shifting water availability, 22 changes
20.
Black, Bennett, Thomas & Beddington, supra note 11, at 448; Janpeter Schilling,
Moses Akuno, Jurgen Scheffran & Thomas Weinzierl, On Raids and Relations: Climate
Change, PastoralConflict and Adaptation in North-Western Kenya, in CONFLICT-SENSITIVE
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA 241,

256-57 (Urmilla Bob & Salome

Bronkhurst eds., 2014).
21.
Xiaoxu Wu, Yongmei Lu, Sen Zhou, Lifan Chen & Bing Xu, Impact of Climate
Change on Human Infectious Diseases: Empirical Evidence and Human Adaptation, 86
ENV'T INT'L 14, 20 (2016); Jolyon M. Medlock & Steve A. Leach, Effect of Climate Change
on Vector-Borne Disease Risk in the UK, 15 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 721, 725, 728
(2015) (describing an increase in mosquito- and tick-borne diseases like West Nile, Lyme
disease, and Dengue Fever); Maha Bouzid, Felipe J. Colln-Gonzalez, Tobias Lung, lain R.
Lake & Paul R. Hunter, Climate Change and the Emergence of Vector-Borne Diseases in
Europe: Case Study of Dengue Fever, 14 BMC PUB. HEALTH, no. 781, 2014, at 1, 5; Colleen
A. Burge, C. Mark Eakin, Carolyn S. Friedman, Brett Froelich, Paul K. Hershberger, Eileen
E. Hofmann, Laura E. Petes, Katherine C. Prager, Ernesto Weil, Bette L. Willis, Susan E.
Ford & C. Drew Harvell, Climate Change Influences on Marine Infectious Diseases:
Implications for Management and Society, 6 ANN. REV. MARINE SCI. 249, 258, 262, 264
(2014) (describing diseases in corals and other marine species); Craig Welch, Climate
ChangePushingTropical DiseasesToward Arctic, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (June 14, 2017), http
s://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2017/06/vibrio-zika-west-nile-malaria-diseases-spre
ading-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/9S8G-3XW2].
22.
See, e.g., Joshua Elliott, Delphine Deryng, Christoph MQller, Katja Frieler,
Markus Konzmann, Dieter Gerten, Michael Glotter, Martina F16rke, Yoshihide Wada, Neil
Best, Stephanie Eisner, BalAzs M. Fekete, Christian Folberth, Ian Foster, Simon N.
Gosling, Ingjerd Haddeland, Nikolay Khabarov, Fulco Ludwig, Yoshimitsu Masaki, Stefan
Olin, Cynthia Rosenzweig, Alex C. Ruane, Yusuke Satoh, Erwin Schmid, Tobias Stacke,
Qiuhong Tang & Dominik Wisser, Constraintsand Potentials of Future Irrigation Water
Availability on Agricultural Production Under Climate Change, 111 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
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in growing seasons, 23 and a variety of problems created by sealevel rise. 24 Slow-onset changes include gradual shifts that happen
over time as temperatures increase and sea levels rise. Obvious
slow changes include gradually increasing temperatures leading
to lower crop yields and a need for farmers to shift crops. 25 Species
may gradually migrate to higher elevations or northern
landscapes. 26 Diseases may spread along with these migrations as
animal disease vectors head further north and live longer into the

&

SCIS. 3239, 3242-43 (2014); ClimateImpacts on Water Resources, ENV'T PROT. AGENCY (Jan.
19, 2017), https:/19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-impacts/climate-impacts-waterresources_.html [https://perma.cc/H2P2-ZQVE].
See, e.g., Taejin Park, Sangram Ganguly, Hans Temmervik, Eugenie S.
23.
Euskirchen, Kjell-Arild Hegda, Stein Rune Karlsen, Victor Brovkin, Ramakrishna R.
Nemani & Ranga B. Myneni, Changes in Growing Season Duration and Productivity of
Northern Vegetation Inferred from Long-Term Remote Sensing Data, 11 ENV'T RSCH.
LETTERS, no. 084001, 2016, at 1, 3, 10 (concluding that thirty-three years of remote sensing
data demonstrated climate impacts on growing seasons); Growing Seasons in a Changing
Climate,U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. CLIMATE HUBS, https://www.cimatehubs.oce.usda.gov/growingseasons-changing-climate [https-/perma.c/6RJR-ZDZH] (last visited June 23, 2020).
See, e.g., Barbara Neumann, Athanasios T. Vafeidis, Juliane Zimmermann
24.
Robert J. Nicholls, Future CoastalPopulation Growth and Exposure to Sea-Level Rise and
Coastal Flooding - A Global Assessment, 10 PLOS ONE, no. e0131375, 2015, at 1, 28
(describing some of the severe impacts from sea level rise); Chelsea Harvey, Sea-Level Rise
Will Cause More than Flooding- These 5 Other Impacts of Rising Oceans Are Just as Bad,
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2015, 10:42 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/5-terrifyingimpacts-of-rising-sea-levels-2015-2 [https://perma.cc/8EQZ-QCVW].
25.
See, e.g., Qingfeng Meng, Xinping Chen, David B. Lobell, Zhenling Cui, Yi Zhang,
Haishun Yang & Fusuo Zhang, Growing Sensitivity of Maize to Water Scarcity Under
Climate Change, 6 SCI. REPS., no. 19605, 2016, at 1, 2 (describing how climate change leads
to lower crop yields); Dan Charles, 5Major Crops in the Crosshairsof Climate Change, NPR
(Oct. 25, 2018, 11:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/10/25/658588158/5-m
ajor-crops-in-the-crosshairs-of-climate-change [https://perma.cd/8M6Z-CNZH].
See, e.g., Anibal Pauchard, Ann Milbau, Ann Albihn, Jake Alexander, Treena
26.
Burgess, Curtis Daehler, Goran Englund, Franz Essl, Birgitta EvengArd, Gregory B.
Greenwood, Sylvia Haider, Jonathan Lenoir, Keith McDougall, Erin Muths, Martin A.
Nunez, Johan Olofsson, Loic Pellissier, Wolfgang Rabitsch, Lisa J. Rew, Mark Robertson,
Nathan Sanders & Christoph Kueffer, Non-Native and Native OrganismsMoving into High
Elevation and High Latitude Ecosystems in an Era of Climate Change: New Challengesfor
Ecology and Conservation, 18 BIOLOGICAL INVASIONS 345, 347 (2016); Climate Central,
Where Will the Animals Go as Climate Changes?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.scie
ntificamerican.com/article/where-will-the-animals-go-as-climate-changes/ [https://perma.c
c/G6QH-WFLT].
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fall. 27 Sea-level rise leads to coastal erosion. 28 Thinning ice
changes hunting and fishing patterns. 29

Rapid-onset disasters tend to attract more press. Rapid-onset
climate impacts are essentially changes based on natural disasters
or reaching tipping points. The most obvious of these are the big
hurricanes that have increased in frequency and intensity,
devastating the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts in the United States. 30
Increased droughts and accompanying fires have reached
unprecedented levels in Australia, 31 California, and elsewhere. 32
While some climate migrants choose to leave based on long-term
slow degradation to the landscape that affects culture and
livelihoods, the most common climate migrant is one responding
to a specific natural disaster or similar threat. Millions of people

27.
See, e.g., Daniel E. Sonenshine, Range Expansion of Tick Disease Vectors in North
America: Implications for Spread of Tick-Borne Disease, 15 INT'L J. ENV'T. RSCH. & PUB.
HEALTH, no. 478, 2018, at 1, 2.
28.
See, e.g., Tiffany R. Anderson, Charles H. Fletcher, Matthew M. Barbee, L. Neil
Frazer & Bradley M. Romine, Doubling of Coastal Erosion Under Rising Sea Level by MidCentury in Hawaii, 78 NAT. HAZARDS 75, 89-90 (2015) (discussing likely increases in
coastal erosion and the impacts of that erosion); Patrick W. Limber, Patrick L. Barnard,
Sean Vitousek & Li H. Erikson, A Model Ensemble for ProjectingMultidecadal CoastalCliff
Retreat During the 21st Century, 123 J. GEOPHYSICAL RSCH.: EARTH SURFACE 1566, 158182 (2018).
29.
See, e.g., Henry P. Huntington, Lori T. Quakenbush & Mark Nelson, Evaluating
the Effects of Climate Change on Indigenous Marine Mammal Hunting in Northern and
Western Alaska Using Traditional Knowledge, 4 FRONTIERS MARINE SCI., no. 319, 2017, at
1, 4; Ed Struzik, Food Insecurity: Arctic Heat Is ThreateningIndigenous Life, YALE ENV'T
360 (Mar. 17, 2016), https://e360.yale.edu/features/arcticheatthreatensindigenous-life_
climatechange_[https://perma.cc/GAP6-RE3L].
30.
Hiroyuki Murakami, Emma Levin, Thomas L. Delworth, Richard Gudgel & PangChi Hsu, Dominant Effect of Relative Tropical Atlantic Warming on Major Hurricane
Occurrence, 362 SCIENCE 794, 794 (2018); Henry Fountain, Climate Change Is Making
HurricanesStronger, ResearchersFind, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2020/05/18/climate/climate-changes-hurricane-intensity.html
[https://perma.cc/SF7E-J
KHP].
Stephanie Ebbs, Climate Change Can 'Supercharge' Wildfires in Australia
31.
Through More Extreme Heat, Drought, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2020, 4:01 PM), https://abcnews.
go.com/International/climate-change-supercharge-wildfires-australia-extreme-heat-droug
ht/story?id=68096029 [https://perma.cc/DAM2-6C63].
32.
Renaud Barbero, John T. Abatzoglou, Narasimhan K Larkin, Crystal A. Kolden
& B.J. Stocks, Climate Change Presents Increased Potential for Very Large Fires in the
Contiguous United States, 24 INT'L J. WILDLAND FIRE 892, 894-95 (2015); Alejandra
Borunda, See How a Warmer World Primed Californiafor Large Fires, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/11/cimate-chang
e-california-wildfire/ [https://perma.ec/66DS-SNFC]; Thomas Fuller & Christopher
Flavelle, A Climate Reckoning in Fire-StrickenCalifornia,N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), http
s://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/10/us/climate-change-california-wildfires.html
[https://perma.cc/WA85-A8UX].
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relocate based on natural disasters 33 like hurricanes,3 4 tropical
storms,35 flooding,3 6 mudslides, 37 and fires.38 While such events
have happened for millennia, climate change increases both the
intensity and frequency of such disasters. 39 The IPCC predicts a
general increase in climate-related migration with a displacement
of 150 million people by 2050.40 The IPCC anticipates migration

&

John Podesta, The Climate Crisis,Migration, and Refugees, BROOKINGS (July 25,
33.
[htt
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/
ps://perma.cc/TK8S-LRKM].
34.
Christopher Galik & Gavin Smith, Climate Change and the Challenge of
Community Relocation, NC ST. NEWS (Aug. 25, 2020), https://news.ncsu.edu/2020/08/climat
e-and-community-relocation/ [https://perma.cc/2SAA-Y794]; Kieran Bhatia, Gabriel Vecchi,
Hiroyuki Murakami, Seth Underwood & James Kossin, Projected Response of Tropical
Cyclone Intensity and Intensification in a Global Climate Model, 31 J. CLIMATE 8281, 8283
(2018) (explaining that hurricanes and other storms could become more intense, reaching
higher categories, based on the warming of the water); see also Chris Mooney, Category 6?
Climate Change May Cause More Hurricanes to Rapidly Intensify, WASH. POST (Sept. 11,
2018, 1:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/09/11/category
2 4
0 01 a
-climate-change-may-cause-more-hurricanes-rapidly-intensify/?utm-term=.a7c269
[https://perma.cc/FY8Z-B4B2] (giving a popular press description of the research on climate
change and tropical cyclone intensity, as well as discussing Hurricane Florence and its
rapid increase in intensity over a few days).
35.
Podesta, supra note 33; James B. Elsner, James P. Kossin & Thomas H. Jagger,
The IncreasingIntensity of the Strongest Tropical Cyclones, 455 NATURE 92, 92-94 (2008)
(explaining that the strongest tropical cyclones are getting stronger as sea surface
temperature increases); see also Hurricanes and Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE
ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/hurricanes-and-climate-change/ [https://perm
a.cc/3SVY-T48T] (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) (discussing reports on the potential climate
change impacts on tropical cyclones).
Podesta, supra note 33; see also Ian Douglas, Kurshid Alam, Maryanne
36.
Maghenda, Yasmin McDonnel, Louise McLean & Jack Campbell, Unjust Waters: Climate
Change, Flooding and the Urban Poor in Africa, 20 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 187, 189-90,
192 (2008).
SANJULA WEERASINGHE, GEORGETOWN UNIV. INST. FOR THE STUDY OF INT'L
37.
MIGRATION, PLANNED RELOCATION, DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CONSOLIDATING
GOOD PRACTICES AND PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 11 (2014), https://www.unhcr.org/54082c

c69.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9GG-VQVE]; see also Stefano Luigi Gariano & Fausto Guzzetti,
Landslides in a Changing Climate, 162 EARTH-SCI. REVS. 227, 232-33 (2016) (explaining
that as climate change produces more precipitation in some areas, more landslides are
likely).
Podesta, supra note 33; Anthony L. Westerling & Benjamin P. Bryant, Climate
38.
Change and Wildfire in California, 87 CLIMATIC CHANGE S231, 8244 (2008); see also
Wildfires and Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/co
ntent/wildfires-and-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/ZUY2-ZB2P] (last visited Sept. 28,
2020) (explaining that there are many more wildfires every year and the fire seasons are
getting longer).
Maarten K. van Aalst, The Impacts of Climate Change on the Risk of Natural
39.
Disasters, 30 DISASTERS 5, 8-9 (2006) (explaining generally that there are increased risks
due to natural disasters as climate change worsens).
ENV'T JUST. FOUND., supra note 13, at 14.
40.
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will accelerate even more if action is not taken to combat global
warming or to improve adaptation mechanisms. 41
Many communities affected by disasters are also experiencing

slow-onset problems. For example, warmer air and water leads to
more hurricanes and more intense ones. 42 These storms often hit
communities that are already grappling with problems of sea-level
rise. 43 Indeed, the slow-onset problem of sea-level rise can make a
community more vulnerable to disasters as coastal buffer zones
diminish.44
B. Migrationas Adaptation
Successful climate change responses proceed along two
trajectories: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation measures seek
to reduce the overall impact of climate change by reducing its
intensity (generally through programs in carbon reduction or
sequestration). 45 We have passed the point where climate change
efforts only focus on mitigation, although no one denies the
importance of this prong. 46 Adaptation refers to the measures that

41.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 736 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2014)
[hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014].
Hurricanesand Climate Change, UNIV. CORP. FOR ATMOSPHERIC RSCH., https://sc
42.

[https://perma.cc/6R8S-Z9N9] (last visited
ied.ucar.edu/hurricanes-and-cimate-change
Sept. 22, 2020).
43.
See generally Tim G. Frazier, Nathan Wood, Brent Yarnal & Denise H. Bauer,
Influence of Potential Sea Level Rise on Societal Vulnerability to Hurricane Storm-Surge
Hazards, Sarasota County, Florida, 30 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 490, 501-02 (2010).
44.
See Henry Fountain, The Hurricanes, and Climate-Change Questions, Keep
Coming. Yes, They're Linked, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/
10/climate/hurricane-michael-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/GL6X-4N9B].
45.
The IPCC defines mitigation as "[a]n anthropogenic intervention to reduce the
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases." Richard J.T. Klein, Saleemul Huq,
Fatima Denton, Thomas E. Downing, Richard G. Richels, John B. Robinson & Ferenc L.
Toth, Inter-Relationships Between Adaptation and Mitigation, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON

CLIMATE CHANGE,

CLIMATE

CHANGE

2007: IMPACTS,

ADAPTATION

AND

VULNERABILITY 745, 750 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), https://www.ipcc.chlsite/assets/up
loads/2018/03/ar4_wg2jfullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/544G-QSEY] [hereinafter IPCC,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007]. Some measures form part of both mitigation and adaptation
efforts, such as land conservation that can aid in carbon sequestration while saving space
for both human and nonhuman migrations. Jessica Owley & David Takacs, Flexible
Conservation in Uncertain Times, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND

POLICY: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY THE IPCC 65, 69-70 (Robin Kundis Craig & Stephen R. Miller
eds., 2016).
46.
Climate-change response strategies have long focused on mitigation, which is the
heart of international climate change law and is embodied by the Kyoto Protocol and Paris
Accord. See Paris Agreement art. 4, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. no. 16-1104; Thomas J.
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people undertake in response to the impacts of climate change. 47
While mitigation measures tend to have one overarching goalreduction of the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphereadaptation is more varied. While mitigation measures have global
effects, adaptation measures are local in nature. Moreover,
because the impacts of climate change vary greatly, so do
adaptation responses. Adapting to a drought requires a different
approach than adapting to increased flooding (of course some
regions face both these concerns at the same time, presenting an
additional adaptation challenge).48

&

Wilbanks, Sally M. Kane, Paul N. Leiby, Robert D. Perlack, Chad Settle, Jason F. Shogren
& Joel B. Smith, Possible Responses to Global Climate Change: Integrating Mitigation and
Adaptation, 45 ENVIRONMENT 28, 30 (2003) (describing how focus on mitigation "dominated
early discussion" of how best to respond to climate change). Yet, mitigation efforts have not
been successful in staving off negative impacts from climate change and the shift in focus
to add adaptation efforts is key. Early proponents of adaptation efforts were originally
viewed as "giving up" to the polluters of the world and suggesting that we learn how to get
used to the new normal instead of working to prevent it. Roger Pielke, Jr., Gwyn Prins,
Steve Rayner & Daniel Sarewitz, Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation, 445 NATURE 597, 597
(2007). That attitude has shifted as the number of people suffering under climate change
continues to rise and it is clear that reductions in greenhouse emissions, no matter how
great, will not be able to prevent negative climate-change impacts. See IPCC GLOBAL
WARMING, supra note 1, at 6-7.
47.
Definitions of climate change adaptation vary slightly. The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change defines adaptation as "[a]ctions taken to help
communities and ecosystems cope with changing climate conditions." ELLINA LEVINA
DENNIS TIRPAK, ORG. FOR EcON. COOP. & DEV., KEY ADAPTATION CONcEPTS AND TERMS 5
(2006). The United Nations Development Programme calls it a "process by which strategies
to moderate, cope with and take advantage of the consequences of climatic events are
enhanced, developed, and implemented." Id. I prefer the IPCC's definition, which describes
adaptation as "the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities." IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 45, at 6. The IPCC continues to
identify three types of adaptation:
Anticipatory adaptation-Adaptation that takes place before impacts of
"
climate change are observed. ...
Autonomous adaptation-Adaptation that does not constitute a conscious
"
response to climatic stimuli but is triggered by ecological changes in natural
systems and by market or welfare changes in human systems....
Planned adaptation-Adaptation that is the result of a deliberate policy
"
decision, based on an awareness that conditions have changed or are about
to change and that action is required to return to, maintain, or achieve a
desired state.
Id. at 869 (emphasis omitted). All three types of adaptation could manifest as migration or
relocation.
W. Neil Adger, Shardul Agrawala, M. Monirul Qader Mirza, Cecilia Conde, Karen
48.
O'Brien, Juan Pulhin, Roger Pulwarty, Barry Smit & Kiyoshi Takahashi, Assessment of
Adaption Practices, Options, Constraintsand Capacity, in IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007,
supra note 45, at 717, 720-22.
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Migration and relocations are adaptation responses to climate
change. 49 Moves spurred by climate change and other factors come
in many forms. People working in this area use the terms
migration, displacement, and relocation to contain all forms of that
movement. The International Organization for Migration defines
migration as movements of people that happen both within and

across international borders.6 0 To some, the term migration is
reserved for the relocations across international borders. Others
use the term to refer to internal migration where those pressured
by climate change move to other parts of their own country. The
World Bank for example, specifically defines climate migration to
be long-term (not temporary, seasonal, or cyclical) movement
within a country but at a distance greater than fourteen
kilometers. 51 Mariya Gromilova uses the somewhat cumbersome
phrase "climate-induced population movement" to refer to the
migrations and relocations that occur in response to changing
climatic conditions.5 2 To minimize confusion in this Article, I refer
to all movements as migrations or relocations and where necessary
specify whether I am referring to internal or cross-border
movement.

C. Climate Refugees?
A complication to this definitional discussion is whether
climate change migrants are ever appropriately called or thought
of as climate refugees. While climate refugee is a popular term, it
may not be correct or useful. First, it can be hard to determine
when an individual or family is moving for climate change reasons
even though we can decipher large movement trends. Second, the
term refugee may be particularly misleading.
Meriting the label climate migrant can be hard to
demonstrate as many factors likely contribute to a family or
individual moving. It can be useful to identify people who move
due to pressures and problems created by climate change because

49.
Robert A. McLeman & Lori M. Hunter, Migrationin the Context of Vulnerability
and Adaptation to Climate Change: Insights from Analogues, 1 WIREs CLIMATE CHANGE
450, 451 (2010); Robert McLeman & Barry Smit, Migration as an Adaptation to Climate
Change, 76 CLIMATIC CHANGE 31, 32 (2006).
50.
Key MigrationTerms, INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/key-migra
tion-terms#migration [https://perma.cc/AP4Z-PN5B] (last visited Sept. 28, 2020).
51.
WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 15, at vii.
52.
Mariya Gromilova, Finding Opportunities to Combat the Climate Change
Migration Crisis: The Potentialof the 'Adaptation Approach," 33 PACE ENV'T L. REV. 105,
108-09 (2015).
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it helps us understand the policy decisions that caused the
problem, allocate responsibility (particularly in terms of funding
relocation efforts), and address the root cause of the problem. In
some cases, however, writers argue that using the label climate
migrant or climate refugee can enable the government to avoid
accepting blame or responsibility. 53 For example, some people who
study the large Syrian migration and conflict agree that the
droughts (droughts exacerbated by climate change) in Syria were
a major force behind the outflow of migrants. 54 However, the
55
policies of the Syrian government that affected land tenure,
agriculture practices, 56 and reinforced a stratified societal
structure are also part of the story.5 7 A label of those leaving as
climate migrants may offer Al-Assad some cover suggesting his (or
his father's) policies are less blameworthy. 58
Even if accepting that environmental conditions are linked to
migrations, labelling the environmental obstacles as climaterelated can be challenging. The United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP) first acknowledged the problems of
environmental migrants in a 1985 definition:

&

See NULL & HERZER RISI, supra note 12, at 29.
53.
54.
See, e.g., Peter H. Gleick, Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria,
6 WEATHER CLIMATE & SOC'Y 331, 332, 336 (2014); Colin P. Kelley, Shahrzad Mohtadi,
Mark A. Cane, Richard Seager & Yochanan Kushnir, Climate Change in the FertileCrescent
and Implicationsof the Recent Syrian Drought, 112 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIS. 3241, 3241-42
(2015). But see Francesca de Chatel, The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian
Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution, 50 MIDDLE E. STUD. 521, 522 (2014);
Jan Selby, Omar S. Dahi, Christiane Frohlich & Mike Hulme, Climate Change and the
Syrian Civil War Revisited, 60 POL. GEOGRAPHY 232, 232 (2017) (asserting that "there is
no clear and reliable evidence that anthropogenic climate change was a factor in Syria's
pre-civil war drought" and that the drought was not a contributing factor to the civil war
or to migration).
See generally Jon D. Unruh, Weaponization of the Land and Property Rights
55.
System in the Syrian Civil War: Facilitating Restitution?, 10 J. INTERVENTION
STATEBUILDING 453, 458 (2016).
See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COUNTING THE COST:
56.
AGRICULTURE IN SYRIA AFTER SIX YEARS OF CRISIS 5 (2017), http://www.fao.org/3/b-i708le.

pdf [https://perma.cc/69DQ-27UF].
See Preethi Nallu, Analysis: Politics of Class and Identity DividingAleppo - and
57.
Syria, NEWSDEEPLY (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2017/0
3/17/analysis-politics-of-class-and-identity-dividing-aleppo-and-syria-2 [https://perma.cc/C
JF2-SYTK]; NULL & HERZER RISI, supra note 12, at 29.
58.
See NULL & HERZER RISI, supra note 12, at 29; Selby, Dahi, Frohlich & Hulme,
supra note 54, at 241 (suggesting the linkage between the conflict and the war is
overblown); Cullen S. Hendrix, A Comment on "Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War
Revisited," 60 POL. GEOGRAPHY 251, 251 (2017) (responding to Selby et al. and noting both
benefits and drawbacks from identifying climate change as a contributor to conflicts in
Syria and elsewhere).
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those people who have been forced to leave their traditional
habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked
environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by
people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously
affected the quality of their life. 59

Having already acknowledged that it can be hard to
determine whether a person is moving because of environmental
conditions, it can be even more complicated to grapple with

whether the environmental problems are created or exacerbated
by climate change. Indeed, environmental problems are frequently
linked to or exacerbated by climate change issues, but it can be
tricky to sus out exact causes of such changes and prolonged
debates over the root causes of the environmental harms may
distract from action more than they spur action.
Equally complicated is the use of the word refugee. The term
climate refugee lacks any formal definition or status. 60 When
relocation is beyond a country's borders, many use the label
climate refugee even though these relocators rarely fit the actual
definition of refugees under international and national laws. To
qualify as a refugee and thereby receive protected status, a person
must demonstrate that her migration is due to her "well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion."6 1

In the only case to directly consider whether a climate refugee
should qualify as a refugee, the New Zealand Supreme Court
rejected the claims of Ioane Teitiota from Kiribati who argued that
he should be able to avail himself of refugee protection based on
the rising sea levels and environmental harm he faced in his home
country. 62 The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal

recognized that Kiribati was suffering from effects of both "sudden

59.
Diane C. Bates, Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused
by Environmental Change, 23 POPULATION & ENV'T 465, 466 (2002) (stating the first
acknowledged definition of "environmental refugees" was from UNEP researcher Essam
El-Hinnawi); see also ESSAM EL-HINNAWI, UNEP, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES 4 (1985).

60.
NULL & HERZER RISI, supranote 12.
61.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954), http://www.unher.org/enus/3b66c2aa10 [https://perma.ccW55J-3S6M].
62.
Teitiota v. Ministry of Bus. Innovation & Emp. [2015] NZSC 107, at [5], [11], [13],
http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZSC/2015/107.html
[https://perma.cc/94Q8-7MX3];
AF
(Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413 [1], [97], http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZIPT/2013/800413.
html [https://perma.cc/5QEZ-H7AK]; see also KELLY BUCHANAN, LAW LIBR. CONG., GLOB.
LEGAL RSCH. CTR., NEW ZEALAND: "CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEE" CASE OVERVIEW pts. H,
III.D (2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cimate-change-refugee/new-zealand-cimate-ch
ange-refugee-case.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8RQ-23HX].
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onset environmental events (storms) and slow-onset processes
(sea-level-rise)."6 3 But, the court held that there was no evidence
Teitiota was being persecuted based on any protected status and
it found Kiribati was trying to protect its citizens from the impacts
of climate change, albeit unsuccessfully. 64 In particular, the
tribunal noted, Teitiota voluntarily relocated and was not forced.
While it did not grant Teitiota's petition, the court left open the
question of whether some level of climate change harm could serve
as the basis for a viable refugee claim. 65 The New Zealand
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the tribunal, but noted that
climate change, "environmental degradation resulting from
climate change or other natural disasters could . .. create a
pathway into the Refugee Convention or protected person
jurisdiction." 66
Despite formal recognition and protection of refugees, many
international efforts acknowledge the struggles of climate
migrants and are working to improve conditions and support relief
efforts. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has
recognized the category of "environmental migrants" and adopted
a set of nonbinding principles that acknowledge that governments
have a responsibility to protect and assist people displaced by
natural disasters. 67 The Paris Climate Accord acknowledges that
climate-related displacement is an issue, and it calls upon the
Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism of
Loss and Damage to "establish .. . a task force to . .. develop
recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize
and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of
climate change."6 8 That taskforce (the Task Force on Displacement
63. AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413 at [39].
Id. at [75], [88].
64.
Id. at [49], [55].
65.
Teitiota v. Ministry of Bus. Innovation & Emp. [2015] NZSC 107 at [13],
66.
http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZSC/2015/107.html [https://perma.cc/542B-YN7B]; see also
BUCHANAN, supra note 62, at pt. IV (summarizing other unsuccessful climate migrant
claims).
67.

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE

CHANGE 4, 7, 9 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/540854f49.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZZ7-KL3B].
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the
68.
Parties, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2
015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XUR-BSHMI (calling upon relevant bodies "to
develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change" and adopting the Paris
Agreement); EXEC. COMM. OF THE WARSAW INT'L MECHANISM FOR LOSS AND DAMAGE, TASK

FORCE ON DISPLACEMENT 6 (2017), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/tfd-handbook.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/M72H-UEL2] (describing the workplan and terms of reference for the
taskforce).
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or TFD) presented its plan of action at the conference of the parties
in December 2019.69 The plan focuses on gathering information of
climate displacement and making it useful to the parties and
others, improving training, looking for funding, and helping
parties and others to assess displacement risks and impacts. 70
D. Type of Movements
Research is helping us better understand how physical
movement of a population can be a successful adaptation
strategy. 71 This physical movement can take many forms. First, it
may be temporary or permanent. Second, it may be internal or
external. And relatedly, it can involve long or short distances.

Some moves may be only individuals or families; other moves may
be entire communities or even nations.
A report from the World Bank (the Groundswell Report)

concluded that by 2050, there would be 143 million internal
climate migrants (those that do not leave their own country but
relocate within it).72 The Groundswell Report asserts most of these

people will be in the developing world: 85.7 million in Sub-Saharan
Africa, 40.5 million in South Asia, and 17.1 million in Latin

America, representing 2.8% of the populations in these areas. 73
This represents 55% of the developing world.74 As the report looks
only at internal migration and does not include seasonal or cyclical
migration, 75 it significantly undercounts the amount of climate
migration occurring. Rapid-onset events seem to be displacing
around 26 million people a year and that number is only expected
to increase. 76 Katrina Wyman explains that despite the
uncertainty in the exact level of climate migrants, the number is
undoubtedly large but hard to assess because of the confluence of

69.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Executive
Committee of the Warsaw InternationalMechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with
Climate Change Impacts, annex I, U.N. Doc. SB/2019/5/Add.1 (Nov. 15, 2019), https://unfccc
.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2019_o5_addl.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBZ2-GJMZI.
70.
Id.
71.
Black, Bennett, Thomas & Beddington, supranote 11, at 447-49.
72.

WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 15.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 181.
Id. at xix.
Id. at vii.
Id. at 4.
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77
climate change and other migration-inducing factors. There is a
general lack of data on climate migrations. 78
As mentioned above, most climate migrations are likely to be
temporary ones. 79 This is particularly true for relocations in
response to rapid-onset events. That is, people will move to stay
with friends and family during drastic weather events. Such
moves are not only temporary but also tend to be internal, moving
only a short distance before returning. 80 Slower onset impacts are
associated with slower relocation responses. Where slower
changes to growing seasons and water availability reduce
agricultural productivity, it can be several years before a family
decides that the best choice is to move. When such moves do come,
they are more likely to be long-term moves without intentions to
return to the same land or areas.
Most relocations (whether temporary or permanent) are
expected to be within a country. 81 The United Nations estimates
that 75% of all migrations are internal, and there is no reason for
82
environmentally motivated migrations to be different. Some of
the Alaskan villages threatened by sea-level rise are considering
moves of only a few miles. 83 Many climate migrants relocate within
the same state, sometimes even within the same city, depending
on the climate change impact at issue.84 For example, the
85
community of Isle de Jean Charles is moving forty miles inland.
The desire to stay within one's country is likely strong as
cultural, language, and familial ties are better established.
Crossing borders is complicated. When climate migrants move to
other countries, the movement is most likely to be from one

Katrina Miriam Wyman, Responses to ClimateMigration, 37 HARV. ENV'T L. REV.
77.
167, 171-72 (2013).
See WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 15, at 57 (the first report to examine migration
78.
due to slow-onset climate impacts).
NULL & HERZER RIsI, supra note 12, at 7.
79.
Id.
80.
81.
Id.
Id.
82.
83.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED PROGRESS

HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION 32
(2009), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO9551.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPP6-M66Z].
Oliver Milman, 'We're Moving to Higher Ground': America's Era of Climate Mass
84.
MigrationIs Here, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/envi
ronment/2018/sep/24/americas-era-of-climate-mass-migration-is-here [https://perma.cc/8D
RF-LSDG].
The New Isle, ISLE DE JEAN CHARLES RESETTLEMENT, http://isledejeancharles.la.g
85.
ov/new-isle [https://perma.cc/ME2Q-PFAG] (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
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developing nation to another developing nation. 86 Only one-third
of cross border migrants move from a developing country to a
developed country. 87 Social networks, family connections, and
resource availability are the strongest determinants for who
migrates

and

where

factors. 88

they

migrate

to,

easily

trumping

environmental
Like other migrations, climate change migrations are often
moves by individuals and families based on a variety of pressures.
They may not be planned far in advance or be part of coherent
public policies. Perhaps counter-intuitive to many, wealthier

people with greater resources and social connections may be most
likely to move. 89 Greater financial resources, skills, and social
networks make such people more mobile generally and more
resilient to climate change impacts. 90 It can be, however, quite
difficult to understand exactly which factors motivate a move.
Several research institutes, including the United Nations, have

noted a lack of data on the issue, with a particular dearth of
information on environmental impacts. 91
86.
NULL & HERZER RISI, supranote 12, at 7 (citing a United Nations Development
Program report that estimates only a third of migrants move from developing countries to
developed countries).
87.
Id.
88.
See Alisher Mirzabaev, Jianguo Wu, Jason Evans, Felipe Garcia-Oliva, Ismail
Abdel Galil Hussein, Muhammad Mohsin Iqbal, Joyce Kimutai, Tony Knowles, Francisco
Meza, Dalila Nedjraoui, Fasil Tena, Murat Tdrke§, Ranses Jos6 Vazquez & Mark Weltz,
Desertification, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
AND LAND: AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DESERTIFICATION, LAND
DEGRADATION, SUSTAINABLE LAND MANAGEMENT, FOOD SECURITY, AND GREENHOUSE GAS

FLUXES IN TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS 249, 285 (2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploa
ds/sites/4/2019/11/06_Chapter-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HQR-XWBP] (describing migration
decisions as being influenced by many factors with climate change "playing relatively lesser
roles" in drought-stricken areas); DELIA DAVIN, INTERNAL MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY

CHINA 49 (1999); IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, supra note 41, at 617 (describing
complexities in urban-ruralmigration due to climate change).
89.
NULL & HERZER RISI, supra note 12, at 7. This is easily seen in responses to the
COVID pandemic, where wealthy individuals and families were able to move from dense
urban areas (like Manhattan) to more rural areas with lower infection rates and more open
space (the Hamptons). Tracey Tully & Stacey Stowe, The Wealthy Flee Coronavirus.
Vacation Towns Respond: Stay Away, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2020/0 3/ 2 5 /nyregion/coronavirus-leaving-nyc-vacation-homes.html [https://perma.cc/88
PC-EVBK]; Robert Frank, Home Prices in the Hamptons Hit Record as Wealthy New
Yorkers Flee to the Beach, CNBC (July 23, 2020, 11:38 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/
23
/coronavirus-home-prices-in-hamptons-hit-record-as-wealthy-new-yorkers-flee.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/EKF3-696C].
90.
Those who prove more resilient to COVID are likely to prove more resilient to
climate change. See Katherine Mach, Xavier Cortada, Nicholas Mignanelli, Jessica Owley
& Ian Wright, Climate Mobility and the Pandemic: Art-Science Lessons for Societal
Resilience (unpublished manuscript on file with Author).
91.
NULL & HERZER RISI, supra note 12, at 8.
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Nearly all climate migrants are reluctant movers. Climate
migrants are not using climate change as an excuse to justify

abandoning their homes but instead generally move only once
92
there are threats to their lives or livelihoods. Out-migration
hotspots include low-lying cities, coastal areas, and zones of high
93
water stress-often agricultural zones. Generally, in-migration
occurs in cities-Bangalore, Guatemala City, and Nairobi are all
expected to increase in population due in part to an influx of
climate migrants. 94 Migrants go to where they believe they will
find employment, housing, and social services.
E.

What Else Is Moving?

When thinking about relocation, we need to remember not
only people move, but land uses also change. We see shifts in areas
for grazing, hunting, and agriculture. For example, environmental
conditions in Kenya are pushing herders onto private land
95
including into nature preserves. Climatic problems and other
pressures have robbed pastoralists of land adequate for grazing
their animals. They have no choice but move on to private lands,
96
but we don't know what the impacts of this migration will be.
Nonhumans will also be moving. Animal migration is not a new
for both
phenomenon, but the locations and patterns of migration
97 Climate
plants and animals will differ under climate change.
planning needs to consider their movements (and human ability to
control or guide such movements as well).
Climate responses are complicated and some of the
mechanisms developed to respond to climate change (for example,
conserving land, shifting agriculture, and biodiversity protection
measures) can actually contribute to the displacement of people
WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 15, at 23.
92.
Id. at xxii.
93.
Id.
94.
Moushumi Sharma, Pastoral Community in Kenya at High Risk from Climate
95.
Change, DOWN TO EARTH (July 4, 2015), https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/pastoral47 2 9
[https://perma.cc/7QWF-8H
0
community-in-kenya-at-high-risk-from-climate-changeWA].
Adam Cruise & Bibi van der Zee, Armed Herders Invade Kenya's Most Important
96.
Wildlife Conservancy, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.comenv
ironment/2017/feb/02/armed-herders-elephant-kenya-wildlife-laikipia [https://perma.cc/8H
LM-TBR4].
Gian-Reto Walther, Eric Post, Peter Convey, Annette Menzel, Camille Parmesan,
97.
Trevor J. C. Beebee, Jean-Marc Fromentin, Ove Hoegh-Guldberg & Franz Bairlein,
Ecological Responses to Recent Climate Change, 416 NATURE 389, 389-91 (2002); Richard
T. Corlett & David A. Westcott, Will Plant Movements Keep up with Climate Change?, 28
TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION, 482, 482-83 (2013).
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and increase climate migration (and accompanying social
conflicts). 98 Climate change responses that involve setting aside
land for conservation, moving people out of historical homelands,
and changing land tenure and economic systems can contribute to
displacement. 99
Additionally, there will be pressures to relocate human
services and infrastructure projects. For example, current climate
projections show the three major San Francisco Bay area airports

underwater with a two-to-four-degree temperature increase.1 00
When Superstorm Sandy hit the east coast of the United States,
major rail lines were impacted. 101 As communities need to relocate
public services and infrastructure both inland and upland, they

will need to look for new places to build.
With an understanding of broad patterns and concerns
connected with climate migration, the following Section drills
down into the U.S. context.
F. The View at Home: Climate Migration in the United States
The United States is a big country, containing over 95,000

miles of coastline and hundreds of ecosystem types. 0 2 The

98.
Arun Agarwal & Kent Redford, Conservation and Displacement:An Overview, 7
CONSERVATION & SOC'Y 1, 3 (2009); Agriculture and Climate Change: Towards Sustainable,
Productiveand Climate-FriendlyAgriculturalSystems, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. (Apr.
2016), https://www.oecd.org/agriculture/ministerial/background/notes/4_backgroundnote.
pdf [https://perma.c/8WZT-8AW3].
99.
Agarwal & Redford, supra note 98; MARK FREUDENBERGER & DAVID MILLER, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., CLIMATE CHANGE, PROPERTY RIGHTS, & RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 4

(2010), https://www.land-links.org/issue-brief/climate-change-property-rights-and-resource
-governance-emerging-implications-for-usg-policies-and-programming/ [https://perma.cc/2
7ZR-F944].
100.

U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED

STATES 8, 148 (2014), http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/system/files_force/downloads/low/N
CA3_ClimateChangeImpactsinthe_United%2OStates_LowRes.pdf?download=1 [https:
//perma.cc/PJ6G-PCAK]; Andrew Freedman, U.S. Airports Face Increasing Threat from
Rising Seas, CLIMATE CENT. (June 18, 2013), http://www.cimatecentral.org/news/coastal-u
s-airports-face-increasing-threat-from-sea-level-rise-16126 [https://perma.cc/5U3H-PE2K].
101.
Matt Coyne, Four Years After HurricaneSandy, New York Transit Still Making
Repairs, KHOU 11 (Oct. 29, 2016, 5:47 PM), https://www.khou.comlarticle/news/four-yearsafter-hurricane-sandy-new-york-transit-still-making-repairs/344221421 [https://perma.cc/
WB4B-TXCV]; Janet Roberts, Ryan McNeill & Robin Respaut, Exclusive: New Jersey
Railway Put Trains in Sandy Flood Zone Despite Warnings, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2012, 8:08
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-sandy-newjersey-railway-idUSBRE8AGOK2
20121118 [https://perma.cc/SKR9-SSAR].
102.

How Long Is the U.S. Shoreline?, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://

oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/shorelength.html [https:/perma.cc/J7XE-D263] (last visited
Oct. 5, 2020); Ecoregions of North America, ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ecore
search/ecoregions-north-america [https://perma.cc/99FX-8JJA] (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
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anticipated climate impacts on the country are varied and severe.
Islands including Puerto Rico and states along the Atlantic Gulf
Coast are expected to be hit hard and frequently by tropical
storms. 1 03 These communities will also be grappling with sea-level

rise and associated problems like erosion and salt-water
intrusion. 104 Other parts of the United States will be occupied with
impacts of higher temperatures on their living conditions and
106
crops. 105 We can also expect spreads of wildfires and diseases.
Such a range of potential impacts makes it hard to summarize the
climate change future we should expect.
Because some impacts are already being experienced, we can
see where people might go and begin to understand the magnitude
of how many people will be affected. It is hard to model climate
change migration in the United States or elsewhere. The
modelling of climate change impacts itself is challenging, adding
into the analysis projections of how humans will react to the
change is even harder.107 To help illustrate the climate change
migration likely to occur in the United States, I summarize some
larger studies and then give examples from four different areas of
the types of migration we might expect to emerge.

A study of migration due to sea level rise suggests 13 million
homes will become uninhabitable by 2050 and relocation will be

necessary. 108 Geographer Mathew Hauer suggests migration will
occur along pre-existing pathways and will be linked to social

Donald Wuebbles, David W. Fahey & Kathy A. Hibbard, How Will Climate
103.
Change Affect the United States in Decades to Come?, EOs (Nov. 3, 2017), https://eos.org/feat
ures/how-will-climate-change -affect-the-united-states-in-decades-to-come [https://perma.cc
/J2ZU-3YVM]; What Climate Change Means for Puerto Rico, ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, https://1
9january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/climate-change-p
r.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC2S-ADMK] (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
Christina Nunez, Sea Level Rise, Explained, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 19, 2019),
104.
[https://p
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/sea-level-rise/
erma.cc/ZY7V-VASA].
See Growing Seasons in a Changing Climate, supra note 23 (explaining that
105.
climate change has "substantial direct and indirect effects" on crops and livestock).
Welch, supra note 21 (explaining that climate change has many potential disease
106.
implications); Wildfires and Climate Change, supra note 38 (suggesting that climate change
will increase fire risks and lead to longer wildfire seasons).
See Milman, supra note 84 ("It is very difficult to model human behaviour under
107.
such extreme and historically unprecedented circumstances .... ").
Mathew E. Hauer, Jason M. Evans & Deepak R. Mishra, Millions Projected to Be
108.
at Risk from Sea-Level Rise in the Continental United States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
691, 691-93 (2016).
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networks. 109 He examined internal migration data from the
Internal Revenue Service to map where he thought likely

relocations would occur.110 He suggests large numbers of people
will leave southern Florida, Louisiana, and the San Francisco Bay
area as well as migrate from New Jersey and areas along the east
coast."' He projects that many people will relocate to noncoastal
areas in Texas, Georgia, and California with in-migration centered
in and around large cities including Austin, Dallas, Atlanta, and

west of Los Angeles along with Chicago and the Washington D.C.
area. 112

Hauer's research suggests that most areas of the United
States will be affected by sea-level rise migrants either as locations
of out-migration or in-migration.1 1 3 Many people focus their
attention on the migration losses that will happen in Florida (he
projects an out-migration of 2.5 million residents with many

southern Florida residents staying in the state but moving north
toward Orlando).1 1 4 Not enough attention, however, is being given

to areas like Texas where Hauer anticipates 1.5 million new
residents with a 1.8-meter increase in sea level. 11 5 Even with

adopting adaptation measures (something we have yet to do in a
real concerted way), Hauer's projections of movement within the
country are high. These numbers suggest that climate change

mitigation and adaptation efforts are not going to stop a flow of
migrants due to climate change impacts within the United States.

Real estate expert Jesse Keenan is one of the first researchers
to find an already-present impact on real estate prices from

109.
Mathew E. Hauer, Migration Induced by Sea-Level Rise Could Reshape the US
PopulationLandscape, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 321, 324 (2017). When Hauer released
his fascinating study projecting movements of people within the United States due to sea
level rise, he took out households earning more than $100,000 a year under the theory that
such people would have a greater ability to adapt to changes (retrofit homes, rebuild after
disaster, etc.) than lower income families. Id. at 322. Others suggest, however, that
wealthier households are more likely to move. Milman, supra note 84; NULL & HERZER RISI,
supra note 12, at 7. Such a pattern may be particularly influenced by the particular climate
change impact that a community is facing. As discussed in the examples in this Section,
wealthy residents of Phoenix are getting tired of the heat and moving north to Flagstaff.
See infra Section I.F.3.
110.
Hauer, supra note 109, at 321 (explaining how Hauer's migration projections were
based on the Internal Revenue Services' annual county-to-county migration data).
111.
Hauer, Evans & Mishra, supra note 108, at 692-93.
112.
Hauer, supra note 109, at 322-23.
113.
See id. at 323.
114.
See id.
115.
See id.
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climate change impacts.1 16 He suggests climate migration within
the United States could be "something twice as large as the
Dustbowl."11 7 To highlight the different types of moves we see in
the United States, I offer examples of four different parts of the
country. These are stories of out-migration combined with some
ideas about where these people might go.
1. Shishmaref. Sometimes, entire communities move based
on a coherent policy. For example, Alaskan Native Villages
Shishmaref, Newtok, and Kivalina are holding community votes
to decide what to do.11 8 Shishmaref is on a barrier island just south
of the Arctic Circle. 119 As arctic ice melts, the people of Shishmaref
are losing their coastline to erosion.1 20 As the ice pack changes,
their ability to hunt suffers.1 21 As the ice melts, it becomes
treacherous. As a conscious adaptation measure, the community
is exploring wholesale relocation.1 22
Climate change impacts in the arctic region are more severe
than in the rest of the world, putting Alaskan communities on the

See Jesse M. Keenan, Thomas Hill & Anurag Gumber, Climate Gentrification:
116.
From Theory to Empiricism in Miami-Dade County, Florida, 13 ENV'T RScH. LETTERS, no.
054001, 2018, at 1, 9; Travis Dagenais, Jesse M. Keenan First to Publish Evidence of
Climate-ChangeEffects in a Real Estate Market; WSJ, CNN, and Others Ground Global
Coverage, HARv. UNIV. GRADUATE SCH. OF DESIGN (June 14, 2018), https://www.gsd.harvar
d.edu/2018/06/jesse-m-keenan-first-to-publish-evidence-of-cimate-change-effects-in-a-re
al-estate-market-wsj-cnn-and-others-ground-global-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/AD92-WM
Z4].
Milman, supra note 84.
117.
Christopher Mele & Daniel Victor, Reeling from Effects of Climate Change,
118.
Alaskan Village Votes to Relocate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/201
[https://perma.cc/VC
6/08/20/us/shishmaref-alaska-elocate-vote-climate-change.html?_r=0
7W-EKAX]; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS ALASKA DIST., AN EXAMINATION OF EROSION
ISSUES IN THE COMMUNITIES OF BETHEL, DILLINGHAM, KAKTOVIK, KIVALINA, NEWTOK,
SHISHMAREF, AND UNALAKLEET 27-29 (2006), https://www.cakex.org/sites/default/files/do

cuments/AVETAReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4L6-ABFF]; Relocating Kivalina, U.S.
CLIMATE RESILIENCE TOOLKIT, https://toolkit.climate.gov/case-studies/relocating-kivalina
[https://perma.cc/NK38-UTUM] (last visited Aug. 12, 2020).
Mele & Victor, supra note 118.
119.
120.
John D. Sutter, Tragedy of a Village Built on Ice, CNN (Mar. 29, 2017, 9:38 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/29/us/sutter-shishmaref-esau-tragedy/index.html [https://pe
rma.cc/37LP-JETU].
Elizabeth Kolbert, Field Notes from a Catastrophe,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006),
121.
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/books/chapters/field-notes-from-a-catastrophe.html
[https://perma.cc/HM5W-Q4EP].
Elizabeth Marino, The Long History of Environmental Migration: Assessing
122.
Vulnerability Construction and Obstacles to Successful Relocation in Shishmaref, Alaska,
22 GLOB. ENV'T CHANGE 374, 376 (2012); Elizabeth Marino & Heather Lazrus, Migration
or Forced Displacement?: The Complex Choices of Climate Change and Disaster Migrants
in Shishmaref, Alaska and Nanumea, Tuvalu, 74 HUM. ORG. 341, 344 (2015).
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frontline of climate change. The changing albedo effect associated
with the loss of snow and ice, along with the positive feedback loop
that comes with melting water, means that the Arctic experiences
greater warming than the rest of the world. 123 The darker ground
reflects light differently, leading to higher rates of melting. 124 As
the melted ice uncovers and then alters the permafrost, the ground
becomes sand, which deteriorates quickly when exposed to
waves. 12 5 The sea ice freezes later into the fall and winter each
year, and then fall storms hit the land harder without a zone of
sea ice to act as a buffer. 126 These impacts have altered the
patterns of the wildlife in the area and hampered hunting and
fishing. 127 The GAO found that 86% of Alaskan Native Villages
experience problems with flooding and erosion. 128

The people of Shishmaref are an Inupiaq hunting community
with a largely traditional lifestyle. 129 This 600-person village is

descendent from peoples who have been in the area for thousands
of years. 130 Previously a nomadic group, Alaskan statehood
followed by the discovery of oil in the area and a mandate for
children to attend school forced the community into a fixed
location. 131 The people of Shishmaref did not choose the location of
the village and originally lobbied for other lands. Now catastrophic
flooding and erosion have led to a loss of homeland and impacts on

hunting.132

123.
Michael Winton, Amplified Arctic Climate Change: What Does Surface Albedo
Feedback Have to Do With It?, 33 GEOPHYSICAL RSCH. LETTERS, no. L03701, 2006, at 3.
124.
Peter Wadhams, The Global Impacts of Rapidly Disappearing Arctic Sea Ice,
YALE ENV'T 360 (Sept. 26, 2016), https://e360.yale.edu/features/as_arctic_oceanicedisapp
earsglobalclimate_impactsintensifywadhams [https://perma.cc/99ES-T9BK].
125.
ELIZABETH MARINO, FIERCE CLIMATE, SACRED GROUND: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN SHISHMAREF, ALASKA 5 (2015).

126.
Id.
127.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 80, at 7-8.
128.
Id. at 12; see also U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS ALASKA DIST., supra note 118
(discussing governmental efforts to curtail erosion in seven Alaskan Native Villages); U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS ALASKA DIST., ALASKA BASELINE EROSION ASSESSMENT at 1-1, 6-1

(2009), https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/BEA/AlaskaBaselineEr
osionAssessmentBEAMainReport.pdf [https:/perma.cc/P5P8-752J].
129.
MARINO, supra note 125, at 2.
130.
Marino, supra note 122, at 377.
131.
David James, More Than Global Warming Afflicts Endangered Shishmaref,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, https://www.adn.com/books/article/more-global-warming-afflicts
-endangered-shishmaref/2016/03/27/ [https://perma.cc/7Q8E-94EV] (July 8, 2016); Alaska's
Oil & Gas Industry, RES. DEV. COUNCIL, https://www.akrdc.orgloil-and-gas#:-:text-The%2
OU.S.%20Congress%20viewed%20that,class%20oi%20and%20gas%20province
[https://pe
rma.cc/U2F7-JJDD] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
132.
MARINO, supranote 125, at 2.
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Shishmaref is not sure what the path forward will look like
for them. Some residents say that climate change is "forcing the
community to consider migration as the only possible response."133
As they lose homes and infrastructure, they cannot afford to
rebuild. 134 This makes them dependent on the federal and state
government or possibly private donors. They want to relocate, if
they must, within their traditional Kigiqtaamiut territory.13 5
Their current efforts are focused on building on nearby tribal
land.1 36 The community had its first vote on relocation in 2002, and

it was not successful. In 2016, the community voted to relocate and
is now working with the government to see if they can make it
happen.137

While they are not proposing a relocation of many miles, it
will be expensive.13 8 No other sites within their traditional
territory have infrastructure. 139 They will need to bring in
everything: electricity, airports, roads, etc. 140 Some balk at the
government paying so much for relocation of only 600 residents. 14 1
Failure to create a relocation plan for the community, however,
will likely result in diaspora as residents instead move to different
towns within Alaska. The Army Corps of Engineers completed a
cultural impact assessment of relocation to Nome or Kotzebue in

133.
Id.
Marino, supra note 122, at 377.
134.
Id. at 15.
135.
136.
Id. at 16.
Kennedy, supra note 6. There have been many complicated and unfortunate side
137.
impacts. For example, they can't get anything repaired now that they are going to relocate.
Jaffe, supra note 6; Weyiouanna, supra note 6. In the years it will take to complete the
move, they will have to live with broken schools, lack of medical facilities, etc.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS ALASKA DIST., SHISHMAREF PARTNERSHIP:
138.
SHISHMAREF RELOCATION AND COLLOCATION STUDY 26, 40 tbl.3-2, 42 tbl.32 (2004), https://

www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/archive/ShishmarefParnershipReloca
tionandCollocationStudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/BVM4-UQFM] (estimating the total capital
requirements to relocate Shishmaref to a mainland location at $179 million in 2004 dollars,
excluding the cost of real estate).
Id. at 32-37 (discussing infrastructure construction needs for a potential
139.
relocation).
140.
Id.
In discussing the similar conditions in Kivalina, Alaska, noted Native American
141.
activist Winona LaDuke suggested it might make more sense just to give each resident $1
million. Winona LaDuke, RENEW Distinguished Lecture: The Need for Water Protectors
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://buffalo.app.box.com/s/u4q3mldrkobw6xpf5mh4c82za0uoxg94 [http
s://perma.cc/UML4-VWGN].
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2005 and concluded it would likely result in a loss of language,
tradition, and village government structure. 142

The Native Village of Kivalina is facing similar climate
change threats but has added complications from the disruption of
the hydrological regimes of a nearby river along with an influx of
invasive species and thinning ice. 143 In response to the climate

change concerns, the people of Kivalina elected to move to a nearby
area that they dubbed Kiniktuuraq in 2000.144 Now, the Army
Corps of Engineers believes that Kiniktuuraq is also in daniger.145
Kivalina is still hoping to relocate its 450-person community, 146
but no one is clear on how it will afford to do so. 14 7 The Native

Village of Newtok also plans to move. It has already identified a
new site and has some federal funding. 148
While the Alaskan villages offer examples of community
relocation where legal and political structures will (hopefully) be
maintained, we can look to island nations in the Pacific to see
entire, fully independent nations that are contemplating
relocation in response to rising sea levels. 149 For example, there
are proposals for the country of Nauru to relocate to Australia 150
while the country of Kiribati has been buying land in Fiji. 151

&

142.
See Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an
Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L.
Soc. CHANGE 357, 397 n.304 (2011) (discussing Army Corps's study).
143.
Relocating Kivalina, supra note 118.
144.
Id.
145. Id.
146.
Id.; Melia Robinson, This Remote Alaskan Village Could Disappear Under Water
Within 10 Years-Here's What Life Is Like There, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2017, 10:00 AM),
[https://perma
https://www.businessinsider.com/what-life-is-like-in-kivalina-alaska-2017-9
.cc/AV3V-WFN2].
147.
See Chris Mooney, The Remote Alaskan Village That Needs to Be Relocated Due
to Climate Change, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2015, 11:10 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/02/24/the-remote-alaskan-village-that-needs-to-be-r
elocated-due-to-climate-change/?utm_term=.60ac3d364a08 [https://perma.cc/FYK9-D682].
148.
Milman, supra note 84.
149.
U.N. Univ. Inst. for Env't & Hum. Sec., Climate Change and Migration in the
Pacific: Links, Attitudes, and Future Scenarios in Nauru, Tuvalu, and Kiribati (Dec. 2,
5 2
2015), http://i.unu.edu/media/ehs.unu.edu/news/11747/RZ_PacificEHS_ESCAP_1 1 01.p
df [https://perma.cc/3QWQ-E9H6]; Maxine Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate
Change, Deterritorialized Nationhood and the Post-Climate Era, 2 CLIMATE L. 345, 351-53
(2011).
150.
Jane McAdam, The High Price of Resettlement: The Proposed Environmental
Relocation of Nauru to Australia, 48 AUSTRALIAN GEOGRAPHER 7, 12 (2017).
151.
Paul Chapman, Entire Nation of Kiribati to Be Relocated over Rising Sea Level
Threat, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2012, 8:59 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
australiaandthepacific/kiribati/9127576/Entire-nation-of-Kiribati-to-be-relocated-over-risi
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2. Miami. Studies by Hauer and others suggest that South
Florida generally, and Miami in particular, will be the focal points
for out-migration.15 2 Some believe the process has already begun,
with at least anecdotal stories of people moving and studies
showing a drop in the housing market. 153 People in the Miami area
are already selling up and moving out. 154 Even the former mayor
of South Miami, Philip Stoddard, considered heading north. 155
Jesse Keenan, Thomas Hill, and Anurag Gumber have
documented a climate change signal in the real estate market,
writing about the phenomenon of what they label "climate
gentrification." 156 Using Miami-Dade County as a case study,
Keenan and colleagues studied likely impacts on the real estate
market from predicted climate change impacts. 157 Prices of
beachfront homes in Miami are going down 158 with an increasing
discount over the past decade. 159 The effect does not exist in rental

ng-sea-level-threat.html [https://perma.cc/2A89-BNEJ]; Laurence Caramel, Besieged by the
Rising Tides of Climate Change, Kiribati Buys Land in Fiji, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2014, 8:00
PM), httpsJ/www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/1l/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-v
anua-levu [https://perma.cc/X4VQ-VPM2].
E.g., Hauer, supranote 109, at 323.
152.
E.g., Keenan, Hill & Gumber, supra note 116, at 1, 9.
153.
See Milman, supranote 84 (telling the story of Chase Twichell who sold her Miami
154.
Beach apartment where she planned to spend her retirement and returned to upstate New
York and explained, "It was like end of the world stuff . . .. It's like a movie where there's
a terrible volcano that is destroying everything, only it's much slower than that.").
Id.; see also Deirdra Funcheon, Behind a FormerFloridaMayor's Idea for Real
155.
Estate Climate RestorationBonds,'BISNOW (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.bisnow.com/index
.php/south-florida/news/sustainabiity/philip-goddard-miami-climate-resiliency-bonds-105
546 [https://perma.c/N58H-7YGA; Gillian Neimark, How a FloridaBiologist Became One
of America's Greenest Mayors, ENERGY NEWS (Jan. 22, 2018), https://energynews.us/2018/0
1/22/southeast/how-a-florida-biologist-became-one-of-americas-greenest-mayors/ [https://p
erma.cc/NX9P-8XCL] (describing Stoddard's view that South Florida residents "will need
to slowly migrate inland while Miami is eventually turned into protected wetlands and
aquatic parks").
Keenan, Hill & Gumber, supra note 116.
156.
Id. at 8-9.
157.
See Asaf Bernstein, Matthew T. Gustafson & Ryan Lewis, Disaster on the
158.
Horizon: The Price Effect of Sea Level Rise, 134 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 257 fig.1, 271 (2019)
(finding that exposure to sea-level rise discounts the average price of real estate, especially
in the nonowner-occupied market).
159.
JONATHAN WOETZEL, DICKON PINNER, HAMID SAMANDARI, HAUKE ENGEL,
MEKALA KRISHNAN, CLAUDIA KAMPEL & MARLIES VASMEL, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., WILL
MORTGAGES AND MARKETS STAY AFLOAT IN FLORIDA? 18 (Apr. 2020), https://www.mckinsey
2

.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Sustainability/Our%2Insights/Will% 0m
ortgages%20and%20markets%20stay%20afloat%20in%20Florida/MGI-Will-mortgages-an
d-markets-stay-afloat-in-Florida.ashx [https://perma.cc/TL4W-VPEU].
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rates, 160 which seems to suggest people are not worried over
current conditions but thinking of future potential damage to
property or loss of land. 161
As climate change and its effects accelerate, some areas (think
inland and north for the most part) become more attractive and
others less (think coastal and south). Combining the predicted
amount of exposures to climate change impacts with social
vulnerability and the patterns of who moves and who gets left
behind can present real environmental justice problems. Florida
politicians worry about the communities that will be left behind
with fewer people to care for the community or pay for government
services.16 2

At the same time that Miami is anticipated to have one of the
highest out-migration rates, in-migration from the Caribbean,
Venezuela, and elsewhere continues.1 6 3 Many people who fled
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico went to Florida with several
deciding to remain there. 164 This is an example of the phenomenon
of climate migrants moving from one precarious position to

another.

160.
Ian Stewart & Lulu Garcia-Navarro, Building for an Uncertain Future:Miami
Residents Adapt to the ChangingClimate, NPR (Mar. 31, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.npr.
org/2019/03/31/706940085/building-for-an-uncertain-future-miami-residents-adapt-to-thechanging-climate [https://perma.cc/D3MT-3STS]. Although rents now appear to be falling
based on impacts from the coronavirus. See Jacob Passy, Rents Are Softening NationwideBut Here's Where They Are Fallingthe Most, MARKETWATCH (June 29, 2020, 11:14 AM), htt
ps://www.marketwatch.com/story/rents-are-softening-nationwide-but-heres-where-they-ar
e-falling-the-most-2020-06-27 [https://perma.c/24LY-FQBH].
161.
The COVID-19 pandemic may be distorting these patterns as people seek warmer
climates, with many New Yorkers in particular looking for properties with more space and
sunshine. Jeffrey Steele, Florida Continues to Lure Movers Amid the Pandemic-Which
Could Help the State with Economic Rebound, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://ww
w.forbes.com/sites/jeffsteele/2020/10/12/is-florida-the-likeliest-to-rebound-first-from-covid/
?sh=f78c037303de [https://perma.cc/D4BU-T4DF]; Rob Wile, Florida Saw a Bigger Jump
in New Residents Than Every State but One, MIA. HERALD (Dec. 31, 2020, 2:54 PM), https://
www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article248200345.html [permalink unavailable].
162.
E.g., Milman, supra note 84 (quoting the then-mayor of South Miami).
163.
See Hauer, supra note 109, at 323; Franco Ordonez, As CaribbeanImmigration
Rises, Miami's Black PopulationBecomes More Foreign, MIA. HERALD (Apr. 10, 2015, 7:18
PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/article18228377.html [https://perma.cc/47CT-CTBT];
Anthony Faiola & Nick Miroff, As Trump Tightens Asylum Rules, Thousands of
Venezuelans Find a Warm Welcome in Miami, WASH. POST (May 18, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/even-as-trump-tightens-asylum-rulesth
ousands-of-venezuelans-find-a-warm-welcome-in-miami/2018/05/15/5e747fec-52cf-11e8-a5
51-5b648abe29ef story.html [https://perma.cc/NN8G-2N2A].
164.
Luisita Lopez Torregrosa, My Home Is Here Now': Growing Number of Puerto
Rican ProfessionalsSettle in Miami, NBC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2018, 8:13 AM), https://www.nbcne
ws.com/news/latino/my-home-here-now-growing-number-puerto-rican-professionals-settlen904786 [https://perma.cc/XL2W-X3A7].
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3. Phoenix. Phoenix, Arizona has always been hot, but lately
things have been getting worse. The average annual high
temperature in Phoenix is 87 degrees, but from June to
September, the average high is 100 degrees or higher.165 In 2017,
155 people died in Phoenix due to the heat. 166 People from Phoenix
are beginning to look elsewhere to find a way to escape the heat. 167
Coral Evans, the mayor of Flagstaff, explains that they are
beginning to arrive in her town. 168 Approximately a two-hour drive

north of Phoenix, 16 9 Flagstaff is about 5,000 feet higher in
elevation. 170 In a pattern that might also merit the label climate
gentrification, the new occupants in Flagstaff are wealthy people
buying second homes. 171 This has increased the housing prices and
the cost of living in the area. 172 Poor residents will be priced out of
places like Flagstaff and likely struggle to move away from
Phoenix.
It is not clear how to reconcile these moves out of Phoenix due
to high temperatures when, at the same time, other studies
suggest Phoenix is a place likely to receive migrants fleeing sea
level rise, flooding, and tropical storms. 173 Such a phenomenon also
illustrates a pattern revealed in other countries where climate

Climate Phoenix - Arizona, U.S. CLIMATE DATA, https://www.usclimatedata.c
165.
om/climate/phoenix/arizona/united-states/usaz0166 [https://perma.cc/D3MT-ENUR] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2020).
Milman, supranote 84.
166.
Oliver Milman, Climate Gentrification: The Rich Can Afford to Move - What
167.
About the Poor?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2018, 4:00 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/environ
ment/2018/sep/25/climate-gentrification-phoenix-flagstaff-miami-rich-poor [https://perma.
cc/LWN8-G4M9].
168. Id. (quoting Evans as saying, "As it gets hotter, we are getting a lot of climate
refugees.").
Driving Directions from Phoenix, Ariz. to Flagstaff, Ariz., GOOGLE MAPS,
169.
https://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/2WRY-GXAE] (follow "Directions" hyperlink;
then search starting point field for "Phoenix, AZ"; then search destination field for
"Flagstaff, AZ").
CompareFastFacts, DISCOVER FLAGSTAFF, https://www.flagstaffarizona.org/med
170.
ia/fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/7F9A-QC33] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020) (approximating
Flagstaff's elevation at 7,000 feet), with Phoenix Facts,VISITPHOENIX, https://www.visitpho
enix.com/about-us/phoenix-facts/ [https://perma.cc/4ZEG-Q8MW] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020)
(estimating Phoenix's elevation at 1,100 feet). See generally Brandon Loomis, Arizona Will
23, 2018,
Suffer More thanMost of U.S. as Climate Changes, Study Says, AZCENTRAL (May
29
7
2
2:12 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-environment/ 01 /06/ /stu
73
[https://perma.cc/
001/
dy-predicts-rising-heat-deaths-costs-arizona-climate-change/4395
JQL5-F377] (estimating future economic losses due to climate change in Phoenix while
projecting counties thousands of feet higher will see a small economic gain).
Milman, supra note 167.
171.
172.
Id.
See, e.g., Hauer, supra note 109, at 324 & tbl.1.
173.
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migrants settle in areas that are also prone to environmental
risks, perhaps creating a pattern of migration unlike previous ones

we have experienced.
Political scientist Amir Jina suggests that the movements due
to the slow onset problems of heat in the south will lead to
"insidious climate migration" and it will be more difficult to
understand how these pressures "will reshape population in the

21st century." 174 These migration patterns are harder to predict in
terms of both out-migration and in-migration. They will happen

gradually as opposed to coming quickly in response to disasters.
Some people will only move during part of the year. High
temperatures affect quality of life and livelihoods but generally
leave structures intact. This may lead to people leaving during the
summer to find work elsewhere. With a home still in one piece and
infrastructure in place, migrants from these areas will follow

different patterns.
4. Midwestern/OklahomaFarmers. It has always been hard
to sustain family farms, and climate change isn't helping things.
In some parts of the United States, the biggest climate impacts
will be on livelihoods that depend on natural resources. Farmers
will have to grapple with both higher temperatures and increased

flooding. 175 There is also the potential for increased pest outbreaks
leading to a need for costly pesticides, making the ability to make
ends meet a challenge. 176 Such people are more likely to be
economically forced from their home rather than ousted by
particular weather events. Indeed, the plight of farmers illustrates

the challenge of determining whether someone is an
environmental migrant or an economic one, showing that the
drivers of relocation are often intertwined.
This problem is being felt across the United States. By 2050,

Texas County, Oklahoma is expected to spend an additional forty
days a year over ninety degrees. 177 This is the largest wheatproducing county in Oklahoma. 178 Rising temperatures in the
174.
175.

Milman, supra note 84 (quoting Jina).
Prasanna Gowda, Jean L. Steiner, Tracey Farrigan, Michael A. Grusak & Mark
Boggess, Agricultureand Rural Communities, in 2 IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 391, 399, 404 (David R. Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018) (providing details on
the state of the farming community from the Fourth National Climate Assessment).
176.
Luca Heeb, Emma Jenner & Matthew J.W. Cock, Climate-Smart Pest
Management: Building Resilience of Farms and Landscapes to ChangingPest Threats, 92
J. PEST ScI. 951, 958-59 (2019).
177.
Milman, supranote 84.
178.
Id.
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Midwest and Plains states are expected to diminish yields for
maize, soybeans, and wheat. 179 Land suitable for growing wine in
California is expected to drop by 70%,180 and wildfires are
exacerbating the situation. Some assert that farmers will not be
able to continue to grow corn profitably without the use of
genetically modified seeds, finding a geoengineering adaptation
solution possible. 181
III. CLIMATE MIGRATION PRESSURES ON LAND USE

With a grounding in who is moving around the United States
based on climate change, we can now begin to think more carefully
about where they are moving to. Few studies have discussed where
climate relocations will occur. 182 This Article is not an attempt to
map the movements of people but instead to think about the
impact of climate migration on certain land types. The goal of this
Article is to invigorate relocation discussions and minimize chaotic

179.
Dan Charles, GardeningMap of Warming U.S. Has Plant Zones Moving North,
58 5 94
2
8/
NPR (Jan. 26, 2012, 2:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2012/01/ 5/14 5
[https:/perma.cc/7PFY-LN
gardening-map-of-warming-u-s-has-plant-zones-moving-north
ZE]; Gowda, Steiner, Farrigan, Grusak & Boggess, supra note 175.
Lee Hannah, Patrick R. Roehrdanz, Makihiko Ikegami, Anderson V. Shepard, M.
180.
Rebecca Shaw, Gary Tabor, Lu Zhi, Pablo A. Marquet & Robert J. Hijmans, Climate
Change, Wine, and Conservation, 110 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIs. 6907, 6910 tbl.2 (2013). This
article prompted a debate over the potential effects of climate change on viticulture.
Compare Cornelis van Leeuwen, Hans R. Schultz, Inaki Garcia de Cortazar-Atauri, Eric
Duchene, Nathalie Ollat, Philippe Pieri, Benjamin Bois, Jean-Pascal Goutouly, Herv6
Quenol, Jean-Marc Touzard, Aureliano C. Malheiro, Luigi Bavaresco & Serge Delrot, Why
Climate Change Will Not Dramatically Decrease Viticultural Suitability in Main WineProducing Areas by 2050, 110 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIS. E3051, E3051 (2013), with Lee
Hannah, Patrick R. Roehrdanz, Makihiko Ikegami, Anderson V. Shepard, M. Rebecca
Shaw, Gary Tabor, Lu Zhi, Pablo A. Marquet & Robert J. Hijmans, Reply to van Leeuwen
et al.: Planning for Agricultural Adaptation to Climate Change and its Consequences for
Conservation, 110 PRoC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIs. E3053, E3053 (2013). See generally Akshat
Rathi, The Improbable New Wine Country that Climate Change is Creating, QUARTZ (Nov.
10, 2017), https://qz.com/quartzy/1108814/the-improbable-new-wine-countries-that-climat
e-change-is-creating/ [https://perma.cc/5LWU-YN6T] (explaining the northern climes
where wine growing might expand).
C.f. Terry L. Anderson, Sea Level Rise Is Pushing Coastal Property Owners to
181.
Move to Higher Ground, CNN (June 3, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://us.cnn.com/2018/06/03/opinio
[https://perma.cc/L4M5-4X3
ns/sea-level-rise-coast-property-opinion-anderson/index.html

W].
Hauer, supra note 109, at 321 ("[Q]uestions of where the millions of potentially
182.
displaced persons will go remain unanswered despite a general understanding that [sea
level rise] displaced persons are likely to have profound effects on future population
landscapes.").
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displacement, 183 where communities only begin to grapple with the
implications of climate migration once people start rolling into
town.

Without delving deeply into trade-offs between renovations
and relocations, we can see that sometimes migration is the best
climate change adaptation strategy. Adaptation in place has its
limits. If local adaptation policies are not well developed or options
appear few, migration may be the best decision. Some policies
deter out-migration where it should be encouraged. For people
living in truly marginal areas or zones that are likely to be subject
to repeated disasters, policies that encourage them to remain in
place (think flood insurance) can actually be maladaptive policies
that make things worse in the long term. For example,
communities that can survive based on remittances are not as

likely to be displaced by climate impacts to crops or livelihoods. 184
In this way, remittances could be undermining needed policy
changes. 185 Thus, we need to think about migration strategies in a
way that facilitates them where migration is appropriate. 186
This Part contemplates sites of relocations, considering the
variety of people and range of land uses that might need a place to
go. It is hard to figure out where people are going. The majority of
people live in cities, and urban areas are traditional receptors of
migrants. 187 For migrants moving from rural areas or those whose

expertise lies in agriculture and other livelihoods more likely to be
found in rural areas, we should anticipate rural migration.

Hauer's maps of migration based on sea-level rise show a lot of

183.
Alex Randall, Getting People out of Trouble, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Nov. 30,
2017), https://mondediplo.com/outsidein/getting-people-out-of-trouble [https://perma.cc/JG
G2-H8PF], republished in CLIMATE & MIGRATION COAL. (Jan. 30, 2018), http://climatemigra
tion.org.uk/governments-back-climate-migration-adaptation/ [https://perma.cc/2YX6-EPG
5].
184.
See WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 15, at xxii (illustrating that 20 million people
in Bangladesh are experiencing health problems based on saltwater intrusion due to sea
level rise but the availability of remittances delays the urgency of relocating).
185.
This may be changing due to COVID-19 as the flow of remittances begins to slow.
Antoinette Sayeh & Ralph Chami, Lifelines in Danger, FIN. & DEV., June 2020, at 16, 17,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2020/06/pdf/COVID19-pandemic-impact-on-re
mittance-flows-sayeh.pdf [https://perma.cc/34RJ-8JHF].
186.
This Article focuses on in-migration, asking what happens when migrants want
to use new lands. An equally important inquiry is to consider what happens to the hollowedout cities left behind.
187.
Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, Urbanization,OUR WORLD IN DATA, https://ourwor
ldindata.org/urbanization [https://perma.cc/5E4Y-VULA] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).
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movement (in and out) in coastal areas but also a net gain in many
rural counties. 188
Human and nonhuman climate migrations along with
shifting needs for infrastructure could place pressures on many
types of land. Lands perceived as not in active use may be
particularly attractive for development. 189 While hopefully
migratory pressures would lead to urban renewal projects by
pushing for use of abandoned buildings or disused facilities for
housing and other services, many developers seek out landscapes
that do not already have any buildings. Vacant lands may be
190 This
easier places to obtain permits or create large projects.
often means either conservation lands or agricultural lands. Such
lands are less likely to have a history of contamination, especially
compared to industrial sites. 19 1 Vacant lands tend to have fewer
landowners to negotiate with during condemnation, sales, or

leases compared to the same number of acres in an urban setting.
Larger parcels are likely to have fewer neighbors. Construction
costs are often lower on land where there are no structures and no
need for demolition or remediation. Open lands are categorized as
either disturbed (soils already disturbed such as with agricultural
land, golf courses, or landfills) or undisturbed land (generally
preserves or conservation land) with conservationists lobbying for
developing already disturbed land. 192 While many agree that the
protection of pristine or undisturbed habitats should be a priority,
attitudes differ in response to disturbed land.

Hauer, supranote 109, at 322 fig. 1.
188.
Jessica Owley & Amy Wilson Morris, The New Agriculture: From Food Farms to
189.
Solar Farms, 44 CoLUM. J. ENV'T L. 409, 425 (2019).
See Kristi MacDonald & Thomas K. Rudel, Sprawl and Forest Cover: What is the
190.
Relationship?, 25 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 67, 73-74 (2005).
See Richard V. Pouyat & Mark J. McDonnell, Heavy Metal Accumulations in
191.
Forest Soils Along an Urban-RuralGradientin SoutheasternNew York, USA, 57-58 WATER
AIR & SOIL POLLUTION 797, 800-01 (1991).
E.g., Joseph M. Kiesecker, Jeffrey S. Evans, Joe Fargione, Kevin Doherty, Kerry
192.
R. Foresman, Thomas H. Kunz, Dave Naugle, Nathan P. Nibbelink & Neal D. Niemuth,
Win-Win for Wind and Wildlife: A Vision to Facilitate Sustainable Development, 6 PLOS
756 6
[https://perma.cc/
ONE, e17566, 2011, at 1, 2, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.001
XA3K-2XER].
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A. AgriculturalLands
The "disturbed" land most attractive to developers is
generally agricultural land. 193 The American Farmland Trust (an
NGO that promotes protection of farmland and tracks farmland
conversion to other uses) estimates that over eighty acres of
farmland are lost every hour in the United States.1 94 In California,
for example, farmland faces pressure to convert to housing, solar
facilities, and environmental conservation zones.1 95 There have
been proponents of developing on other disturbed but open areas
like landfills and old mining sites, but people worry about

environmental contamination and other potential negative effects
(and the liability that goes with them).1 96 Thus, agricultural land

is attractive and conversion of such lands seems less politically
contentious than conversion of conservation lands. While the
issues regarding climate adaptation measures on agricultural land
(not for agricultural purposes) is a complicated and important
issue to address, the remainder of this work considers the

potential legal constraints on use of conservation lands.
B.

Conservation Lands
While a majority of migrants are likely to aim for urban areas,

conservation lands present a particularly important element of the

story. Conservation lands can be attractive for settlement because
of the amenities that come with them, including their aesthetic
beauty. There is a feeling that conservation lands are unoccupied
and therefore less likely to be places of conflict between migrants
and previous residents. Struggles over resource rights and lands
in particular are consistently identified as a source of conflict
between migrants and local inhabitants worldwide. 197 Moreover,
conservation lands have an important role to play in both

193.
See Elizabeth Brabec & Chip Smith, Agricultural Land Fragmentation: The
Spatial Effects of Three Land Protection Strategies in the Eastern United States, 58
LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 255, 256-57, 259 (2002) (discussing strategies to reduce
agricultural fragmentation).
194.
JULIA FREEDGOOD, MITCH HUNTER, JENNIFER DEMPSEY & ANN SORENSEN,
FARMS UNDER THREAT: THE STATE OF THE STATES 3 (2020), http://s30428.pcdn.co/wp-conte

nt/uploads/sites/2/2020/09/AFT_FUTStateoftheStatesrev.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PGL-SP
GY] (putting the number at 2,000 acres per day).
195.
Owley & Morris, supra note 189, at 423, 425.
196.
Amy Morris, Jessica Owley & Emily Capello, Green Siting for Green Energy, GEO.
WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV'T L., Summer 2014, at 17, 23-24.
197.
NULL & HERZER RISI, supra note 12, at 16.
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mitigation and adaptation programs and may therefore warrant
special protection efforts.
Encroachment onto conservation lands has already been
happening around the world as people face environmental and
other pressures. Lack of active human occupiers of the land may
be a factor in the likelihood of people moving onto such lands. In
the United States, conservationists hypothesize that conservation
lands will quickly be the target of infrastructure and energy
projects as climate impacts decrease the viability of planned or
current sites. 198 Such lands are already the location of illegal
9
activities because of the lack of vigilant oversight19 and trespasses
200
for grazing and other agriculture uses are frequent.
The potential for climate migration and relocation of services
due to climate change on these lands means that it is important to
understand the constraints and potentials for these lands now,
before the pressures intensify. The following Part thus examines

&

See Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Has Lost 24 Million Acres of NaturalLand in 16 Years:
198.
Independent Report, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2019, 11:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-environment-publicland/u-s-has-lost-24-million-acres-of-natural-land-in-16-years-inde
pendent-report-idUSKCN1UW0A8 [https://perma.cc/7AKE-B5KC]; James E.M. Watson,
Oscar Venter, Jasmine Lee, Kendall R. Jones, John G. Robinson, Hugh P. Possingham
James R. Allan, Protect the Last of the Wild, NATURE (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.nature.co
m/articles/d41586-018-07183-6 [https://perma.cc/HWV4-NQ8J]; Matt Lee-Ashley, CAP
Public Lands Team, & CAP Oceans Team, How Much Nature Should America Keep?, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/
2019/08/06/473242/much-natureamerica-keep/ [https://perma.ec/ZJE9-MH75].
Illicit growing of marijuana is a good example of this. Jessica Owley, Unforeseen
199.
Land Uses: The Effect of MarijuanaLegalization on Land Conservation Programs,51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1673, 1689-90 (2018).
Trespass is particularly an issue in the western United States where there are
200.
ranchers that illegally graze cattle and other animals. See Jaime Fuller, The Long Fight
Between the Bundys and the Federal Government, From 1989 to Today, WASH. POST (Jan.
4, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/15/everythi
ng-you-need-to-knowabout-the-long-fight-between-cliven-bundy-and-the-federal-governme
nt/ [https://perma.cc/UQE4-9DJ3] (detailing the sensational development of a 20-year fight
between Nevada rancher Bundy and the Bureau of Land Management after Bundy refused
to prevent his cattle from grazing on protected lands that ultimately resulted in an armed
standoff); Press Release, Bureau of Land Mgmt., BLM Seeing More Occurrences of
Unauthorized Use on Public Lands (May 7, 2019), https://www.blm.gov/press-release/bl
m-seeing-more-occurrences-unauthorized-use-public-land [https://perma.cc/3S8C-WTWQ];
Bobby Magill, Land BureauBegins Overhaul of Flashpoint Grazing Rules, BLOOMBERG L.
(Jan. 17, 2020, 2:56 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/land-b
ureau-begins-overhaul-of-flashpoint-federal-grazing-rules [https://perma.cc/KDK6-DAL4].
We also see a lot of trespassing on private lands where neighbors or landowners slowly
encroach on to protected lands. See JESSICA JAY, CHERYL CUFRE & DAVE ERICKSON, LAND
2
TR. ALL., TACKLING TRESPASSERS 2, 3 (2017), https://alliancerally.org/wp-content/uploads/
017/05/Rally2017_A10.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2AH-SRDQ] (demonstrating that trespasses
and encroachments are a frequent enough occurrence that they have annual workshops on
it).
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current legal constraints on conservation lands, indicating
barriers to development and opportunities for communities and
governments to clarify potentially conflicting social goals and
provide guidance for judges and other decisionmakers.
Land use needs of climate migrants range from housing
(temporary or permanent) to grazing and agricultural lands. In
some places, migrants will look to conservation lands for shelter
and in other places for livelihood or subsistence needs. Also, where
conservation lands serve as recreational lands or spiritual respites
for city dwellers, conservation lands near likely in-migration sites
are likely to see increased use.
IV. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON CONSERVATION LANDS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS

Conservation lands in the United States and elsewhere come
in two main flavors: public and private. While there is a
complicated mixture of public and private interests on all land,
this Part looks at the underlying landowner and categorizes
property based on whether it is held by a government entity and
thus "public" or owned by a nongovernmental organization or

individual and thus "private." This Article examines the U.S.
situation as a model, but most of the analysis here applies
elsewhere as well. Many countries follow similar patterns in their
approach to land conservation and some have even more
complicated categories of land protection initiatives and
ownership.
A.

Public ConservationLand

In the context of this Article, public land conservation refers
to conservation of land owned by a public entity, not measures
undertaken by the political branches to effect environmental
protection on private lands. Governments own many acres of land.
In the United States, the federal government owns about twentyseven percent of all land and holds the subsurface rights over
thousands of additional acres. 201 Beyond the federal level, state
and local governments also hold millions of acres of land. 202 Lands
under public ownership can be targeted for conservation or other
201.
CAROL HARDY VINCENT, LUCAS F. BERMEJO & LAURA A. HANSON, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 4, 6 (2020).

202. Public Land Ownership by State, NAT. RES. COUNCIL OF ME., http://www.nrcm.or
g/documents/publiclandownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F4P-8Q4M] (last visited Oct. 4,
2020).
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public uses. As land in public hands, we generally think of such
property as being available to the government holders to use for
any public purpose, giving them a relatively free hand in
determining what the conservation rules should be or how such
lands might be used to respond to climate change. Yet, the mere
ownership of land by a public entity does not actually give that
entity free rein with respect to the use of that land.
Federal lands in the United States are under the
management of federal land management agencies. The four
largest land managers are the Bureau of Land Management, the
U.S. Forest Service, the National Park Service, and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service. 203 Most agencies were created by statute,
4
generally termed the "organic act" of the agency. 20 This Section
details the management mandates operating on the majority of
205
federal land, organized by land management agencies.
1. NationalParks. While the National Park Service (NPS) is
not the federal agency that holds the most land, it is the best
known and the most beloved. Its management mandate is the most
restrictive. The 1916 Organic Act requires the NPS to "conserve
the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in the
System units and to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery,
natural and historic objects, and wild life in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations." 2 06 This terse statute creates a tension between
protecting the land and helping people to enjoy it. Additionally,
when Congress creates individual parks, the establishment acts
provide further instructions regarding park operations and
purposes. Based on these statutes, the NPS has passed
VINCENT, BERMEJO & HANSON, supra note 201, at 3. Additional land is held and
203.
managed by the Department of Defense, the Bureau of Reclamation, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, and other agencies that hold even smaller parcels. Id.
Federico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and National Park Service:
204.
ParadoxicalMandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74
DENVER U. L. REV. 625, 629, 631 (1997). While the National Park Service and U.S. Forest
Service have clear organic acts, the other two agencies were actually formed before their
organic acts, meaning that they operated for several years before having clear statements
of their missions. See Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the
Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 459 (2002) (explaining
that the National Wildlife Refuge System did not get a congressional charter explaining the
goals and policies for land management until 1997).
The Department of Defense is the other large land manager, owning 8.8 million
205.
acres (and this does not include the public works projects governed by the Army Corps of
Engineers). VINCENT, BERMEJO & HANSON, supra note 200, at 3, 6. Together, these five
agencies govern 96% of the federal lands. Id. at 3.
54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014)).
206.
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regulations 207 governing the management of its 421 sites and over

85 million acres of land. 208 The NPS interprets its mandate as
highly restrictive of activities that can take place on the land. It
prohibits resource extraction, hunting, and most permanent
occupation.

These laws not only instruct the National Park Service, but
they also serve as the basis for litigation against the NPS for its
management choices. Through the Administrative Procedure Act,
anyone with standing can sue the NPS for failing to comply with
either the agency's organic act or the unit's enabling act. 209 Over

the years, several court cases have sought to challenge the balance
that the NPS strikes between environmental protection and
recreational enjoyment.

Because of the NPS's statutory mandate and historical park
practices, it is unlikely that this federal land will provide
opportunities for climate migrants. Desires to cultivate or graze on
parkland would run directly counter to law. Permanent and longterm housing has only been allowed in narrow circumstances to

provide for park employees and volunteers. 210 The only extractive
activities allowed are actions that have been grandfathered in.211
For these very reasons, park service land may also be
attractive. It is rich in natural resources and offers open space and
clean water. Expanding permissible uses to include those needed
by migrants would require a statutory change. Such a move would

be regrettable, however. While the acreage may sound large, it is
a small portion of the country that is being set aside for
conservation purposes and parkland provides much needed
refuges for various species as well as spiritual refuge for humans.
Protection of these sites is a necessary component of climate
change mitigation and adaptation.

2.

U.S. Forest Service Lands. Congress created the U.S.

Forest Service in 1897, predating the National Park Service and
serving as the federal government's first land management
207.
36 C.F.R. §§ 1-99 (2019).
208.
About Us, NAT'L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/faqs.htm [https://perm
a.cc/N7YS-7HFX] (Jan. 21, 2021).
209.
John Lemons, Revisiting the Meaning and Purpose of the 'NationalPark Service
OrganicAct," 46 ENV'T MGMT. 81, 84-86 (2010).
210.

NAT'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REFERENCE MANUAL #36:

HOUSING MANAGEMENT 2, 76, 78 (2010) (detailing the authorities behind providing
employee housing on Government property and the procedures required).
211.
Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Oil and Gas Drilling in National Parks, 56 NAT.
RES. J. 145, 164 (2016).
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agency. 212 Today, the Forest Service manages roughly 193 million
acres of federal land on behalf of the people of the United States. 213
Forest Service lands produce a significant amount of lumber but
also provide other ecosystem services and amenities. 214 The
contours for how the Service manages lands are outlined by
statute. The original Organic Act from 1897 states that the
purposes of the federal forest reservations are "to improve and
protect the forest . .. or for the purpose of securing favorable
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United
States." 215 Thus, the permissible purposes of the forests are
limited.
The 1897 Act also charged the Secretary of Agriculture to
make rules and regulations governing the "occupancy and use" of
the forests as well as "to preserve the forests thereon from
destruction." 216 While the Act tells us that the purposes of forest
must be to protect timber and water, the language does not
suggest that other compatible uses would be prohibited. Indeed,
there appears broad leeway for the Forest Service (the created
agency) to set rules regarding forestland, but as an overarching
goal, the agency must work to prevent destruction of the forest.
Following these guidelines, the Forest Service has allowed
grazing, mineral development, hunting, water diversions, and
other extractive uses.
The Organic Act language above, only provides a general
background of initial uses of the forests. Two later laws modified
the potential purposes of the forestlands with the 1976 National
Forest Management Act (NFMA) explicitly superseding the 1897
Organic Act. For over fifty years, the U.S. Forest Service had
operated with only the basic instructions of the Organic Act,
meaning that the agency had a lot of flexibility in its regulations
and permitting.2 17 A result of this was a heavy emphasis on logging
and resource extraction. Congress became involved in efforts to
expand the operations of the Forest Service in 1960 with the
212.
CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NATURAL
RESOURCES LAw: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 292-95 (3d ed. 2013)

(detailing the history behind the U.S. Forest Service Organic Act).
213.
By the Numbers, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/about-agency/newsroo
m/by-the-numbers [https://perma.cd/4G5Y-LD6C] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
214.
KLEIN, CHEEVER & BIRDSONG, supranote 212, at 297.
Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 34 (1897) (current version
215.
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 475).
16 U.S.C. § 551.
216.
217.
KLEIN, CHEEVER & BIRDSONG, supranote 212, at 297.
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Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act (MUSY). 2 18 While this statute
had no enforceable obligations, it nominally expanded the Forest
Service's goals to include providing for "outdoor recreation, range,
timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes" 219 while still

reinforcing the original purposes of the Organic Act. 2 20 While the
MUSY Act did not immediately mandate a change in agency
behavior, it did begin an acknowledgment that forests have value
beyond the timber they supply and showed that Congress was
ready to delve into the actual workings of the Forest Service.
After a 1975 district court case 221 demonstrated that the
Forest Service Organic Act was not a workable statute in terms of
providing on-the-ground rules for timber harvesting and
management, Congress passed the National Forest Management
Act of 1976.222 The essence of NFMA is that the Forest Service
must acknowledge the multiple desirable uses of the forest as
outlined in the 1960 MUSY statute. It also required the Forest

Service to create forest management plans for each forest unit to
determine the best use of the public resources.
Alongside these general forest laws, individual forest units
(and sometimes areas within forests) may be governed by laws
that are more restrictive. The establishment act for a particular
forest often has rules that are more restrictive. The Norbeck
Organic Act of 1920, for example, created the Norbeck Wildlife
Preserve, which is currently part of the Black Hills National
Forest in South Dakota. 223 For land within the preserve area, the
Forest Service must set wildlife protection as the dominant
purpose of the land. Some rules cover multiple lands like the
Roadless Area policies (protecting forestlands where roadbuilding

has not yet occurred). 224 Designated wilderness areas must comply
with the strict prohibitions of the Wilderness Act of 1964, which
prohibits permanent structures,
among other things. 225

§§

roads, and commercial uses,

528-531.

218.

16 U.S.C.

219.

Id. § 528.
Id. ("The purposes ...

of this title are declared to be supplemental to, but not in
220.
derogation of, the purposes for which the national forests were established .... ").
221.
Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 948, 954 (4th Cir. 1975).
This case is commonly called the Monongahela case.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600, 1604.
222.
223.
Sierra Club-Black Hills Grp. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1281, 1284-85 (10th
Cir. 2001) (explaining the Norbeck Organic Act of 1920).
224.
State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management, 36 C.F.R. §§ 294.10,
294.14 (2019).
225.
16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
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Forests are more than just sites of timber production. Forest
Service land includes ski resorts, lakes, wilderness areas, historic
sites, rangeland, and sites of active mineral exploration and
extraction. 226 In this context, forestlands provide opportunity sites
for accommodation of climate migrants and expanded use by
migrants to meet housing and livelihood needs. Under the current
planning framework, agency officials can create proactive
strategies for determining good areas for expansion of rangeland,
erection of temporary housing, as well as increases in hunting and

permitting the gathering of nontimber forest products. There
should be no general legal impediment because of the recognition
that the land could provide multiple uses as long as the Forest
Service works to minimize destruction of forest resources. While
one must carefully review the laws pertaining to each individual
unit, there are often large areas where the flexibility of the
planning process and the existence of multiple goals will leave
room for climate adaptation even where that adaptation may
include higher intensity uses of the land. Because of the legal
structure at work here, accommodating climate migrants on forest
service lands will be possible through executive action. It will not
require statutory changes from Congress as is the case with the
National Park Service.
3. The Bureau of Land Management Lands. The Bureau of
Land Management (BLM or the Bureau) is the government agency
responsible for overseeing the most acres of federal land. Formed
in 1946, it governs almost 245 million acres in the United States. 227
The Bureau is responsible for one in every ten acres of land across
the United States. 228 The BLM's responsibilities are defined by the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.229 The BLM's
charge is similar to that of the Forest Service with a need to
provide for "sustained yields of multiple uses, including recreation,

See, e.g., Managing the Land, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.usda.gov/mana
226.
ging-land [https://perma.cc/6JAS-B4SE] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020); Recreation, Heritageand
Volunteer Resources, U.S. FOREST SERV. (Mar. 13, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.fs.usda.g
[https://perma.cc/7KJM-LNVS];
ov/managing-land/national-forests-grasslands/recreation
Minerals & Geology Management, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/geology/ [https:
//perma.cc/V6EY-Y3M9] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020); Forests and Grasslands, U.S. FOREST
SERV. (Dec. 18, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.fs.usda.gov/managing-land/national-forests-gr
asslands [https://perma.cc/ND46-KT38].
227.
VINCENT, BERMEJO & HANSON, supra note 201, at 4.
What We Manage, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/about/what-we-ma
228.
nage [https://perma.cc/9GNU-ELYD] (last visited Dec. 24, 2020).
229.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787.
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grazing, timber, energy and minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish

habitat, and conservation." 230
The largest array of activities occurs on lands managed by the
Bureau including some intensive extractive industries. The
Trump
Administration
actively
encouraged
increased
nonrecreational use of such lands and worked to lessen the
restrictions upon them. 2 3 1 Thus, these regions represent the best

opportunities for expanded and intensive land uses. Such lands
may be particularly useful to ranchers in the West needing to

expand agriculture activities as hotter temperatures shift or limit
vegetation.

4. Wildlife Refuges. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
manages 89 million acres for protection of birds and wildlife. 232
The first national wildlife refuge was established in 1903. The

Refuge System itself was created in 1966.233 However, it did not
get a true organic act outlining its operational mandate until
1997.234 These lands have specific goals of protecting wildlife
habitat, and it is unlikely that Congress would permit expansion
for housing, grazing, or agriculture. Hunting, though, is a common
activity on wildlife refuges and may provide some opportunities. 23

Such lands may be particularly helpful to Alaskan Native Villages
that need to relocate their towns or shift traditional hunting
grounds.

5. Summary. The restrictions on land management agencies
likely make little federal land available for extensive use by
climate migrants, but still leave open some possibilities. While
permanent housing would be hard without a statutory change,
renewable resource extraction (agriculture, range, logging,

hunting, and fishing) could be consistent with statutory rules for
all but park lands. The question of public land availability for
climate migrants is not a simple question. One needs to examine

230.
VINCENT, BERMEJO & HANSON, supra note 201, at 4.
231.
See Jim Robbins, Open for Business: The Trump Revolution on America's Public
Lands, YALE ENV'T 360 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/open-for-business-thetrump-revolution-on-public-lands [https://perma.cc/8TQE-LC5C].
232.
VINCENT, BERMEJO & HANSON, supra note 201, at 5.
233.
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd668ee.
234.
Fischman, supra note 204, at 459.
235.
Why Hunting is Allowed on Refuges, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fw
s.gov/refuges/hunting/why-hunting-is-allowed-on-refuges/
[https://perma.cc/MC27-RLK4]
(June 11, 2020).
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both the individual lands at issue and the potential uses of those
lands to evaluate whether such uses by migrants could be
consistent with the current law. Where it is not consistent (and
public outcry is adequate), legislators can alter the statutes to
enable greater use of public lands. What Congress creates;
Congress can change. If the federal government did want to
change policy regarding the management of these lands, it could
do so by repealing or amending the statutes establishing the
reserves. Such an action would not be easily (nor should it be
lightly) done however. 236
While the statutes above present reasons to be either
optimistic or not about the availability of federal conservation
lands to help climate migrants, there is a bigger impediment. A
key problem with planning for climate change adaptation through
migration on federal lands is that the lands are not evenly
distributed. Most federal lands are in the Western half of the
country and Alaska. This highlights a particular concern when
viewed in conjunction with maps that show likely climate change
out-migration zones. 237 While sea-level rise is not the only area of
concern for climate migration, a combination of sea-level rise and
communities subject to rapid-onset problems from storms indicate
geographical areas for concern. Unfortunately, there are key areas
where available public lands and likely in-migration areas do not
overlap. While it may seem comforting to know that there is a lot
of federal land in California, there is little along the east coast.
Additionally, much of the federal land that is in California is well
inland and would be a long migration distance for those most
affected. Additionally, wildfires increasingly plague these lands.
Nonfederal public lands could play a role. For example, New
York has less than one percent federal land, but has vast areas
protected by state and local governments. State and local protected
areas generally give more flexibility to the government
management entities to manage and alter the lands as compared
to the federal land managers. This is not always true though.
Parks established by statute (for example the Adirondacks in New

The Trump Administration was eager to loosen the restrictions on federal lands
236.
for extractive uses. In theory, this would seem that the government would be open to
nonconservation uses of the land. We must couple this, however, with the overly hostile
approach to immigrants generally. Maybe the agencies would be open to internal
relocations or temporary relocations. We have yet to see how the Biden-Harris
Administration will develop its public lands and immigration policies.
Hauer, Evans & Mishra, supra note 108, at 692 fig.2, 693 fig.3; Hauer, supra note
237.
109, at 322.
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York)238 have mandates and regulations to which they must
adhere. 239 One would have to examine not only the individual state
and local laws regarding the land holdings generally but also likely
the factors surrounding the creation or establishment of the
various public holdings. Again, we may have laws circumscribing
their use. Where these are legislative pronouncements, they may
be changeable. Sometimes the task may be harder. For example,
in New York, the state constitution prevents conversion of
parkland to other uses.2 4 0 These concerns help highlight the need
to involve private lands in the equation.
B.

Private ConservationLand

The unequal distribution of public conservation lands
highlights the importance of private lands in the climate migration
debate. Figure 1 below illustrates that private lands carry the
majority of the forestland in the United States, particularly along
the east coast where flexibility and resiliency may be most needed.

238.
History of the Adirondack Park, ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY, https://apa.ny.gov/A
boutPark/history.htm [https://perma.cc/ZA3X-YD2Z] (last visited Sept. 28, 2020).
239.
The six-million-acre (larger than the Yellowstone, Yosemite, Grand Canyon,
Great Smoky Mountains, and Everglades National Parks combined or larger than the
entire state of Vermont) Adirondack Park in New York was created in 1892. The
Adirondack Park, ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY, https://apa.ny.gov/about-park/index.html
[https://perma.cc/H9KK-8KNG] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020). In 1971, then-Governor Nelson
Rockefeller created the Adirondack Park Agency to oversee and plan for the park. History
of the Adirondack Park, supra note 238. Although activities within the park boundaries
must follow the plans outlined by the agency, there is more flexibility for land use (including
use by potential climate migrants) than we have for other parks in the state or for federal
parks.
240.
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble with
Time: Influencing the Conservation Choices of Future Generations, 44 NAT. RES. J. 601, 608
(2004).
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Figure 1. Forestland in the United States (Public and
24 1
Private)

While there is no comprehensive image of private
conservation lands in the United States, we do have some
information about lands protected by land trusts and subnational
governments. Figure 2 draws upon data from the National
Conservation Easement Database. 242 This admittedly incomplete
map shows locations of conservation easements in the United
States. The shapefiles on the map can be hard to assess at this
scale. Some protected areas don't appear when we zoom out this
far and others appear larger than they are, giving perhaps a fuzzy
image of the land area under discussion. We can see from this map
though that the areas of strong private land protection dominate
where there are few public lands.

241.
Forest-Ownership-Map, FOREST LANDOWNERS, https://www.forestlandowner
s.com/forest-facts/attachment-forest-ownership-map/ [https://perma.cc/X88G-SY4M] (last
visited Oct. 31, 2020). A full color version of this figure is available at https://www.forestlan
downers.com/forest-facts/attachment-forest-ownership-map/ or on file with the Houston

Law Review.
242.
Interactive Map, NAT'L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, https://www.consei,
vationeasement.us/interactivemap/ [https://perma.cc/VJ6S-8LNW] (last visited Dec. 24,
2020). A full color version of this figure is available at https://www.conservationeasenent.u
s/interactivemap/ or on file with the Houston Law Review.
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Figure 2. Conservation Easements recorded in the National
Conservation Easement Database

Private conservation lands come in a few flavors. Some lands
are wholly owned by nonprofit organizations that dedicate the
lands to conservation for a particular resource, scenic view, or
other public goal. Lands held by the Audubon Society serve as a
good example. The organization owns many nature centers and
reserves across the United States for the purpose of both
protecting birds and their habitat as well as providing recreational
(mostly birdwatching) and educational experiences.24 Sometimes
individual landowners also just decide to protect their land or buy
large acres of land for conservation. The Rockefeller family did this
famously near Yellowstone but also in upstate New York and
elsewhere .4
With private protected lands, the current
landowners can decide to change the land uses to meet changing
societal or personal needs at any time. Many conservationists seek
a greater guarantee of land protection or want to protect more
acres than they can possibly own outright (for either financial or
243.
A bout
cc/7QC5-NJF`Y]

SOC'Y, https://www.audubon.org/about
5, 2020); Wildlife Sanctuaries Across

Us, NATI'L AUDUBON

[https://perma.

(last visited Oct.

Massachusetts,

MASS. AUDUBON, http://www.massaudubon.org/get-outdoors/wildlife-sanctuaries

erma.cc/FLX6-7HSZ]

(last visited

Oct.

[https://p

31, 2020).

244.
Earl Brechlin, Rockefellers a Force in Conservation, ELLSWORTH AM. (June 8,
2015). http://www.ellsworthamerican.com/rockefeller/rockefellers-a-force-in-conservation/
[https://perma.cc/VZ3H-W5EJ]. Ted Turner is another well-known conservationist, with
both Turner Ranch and Turner Foundation working to protect millions of acres. Turner
Ranches, TED TURNER: TURNER ENTERS.,

INC.,

http://www.tedturner.com/turner-ranches/

[https://permia.ce/3YQ9-QXA2] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020); Protecting & Restoring the
Natural World., TURNER FOUND., INC., http://www.turnerfoundation.org/ {https://perma.ce/

8XCX-Y2HA]

(last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
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logistical reasons). In such cases, people use property law tools to
encumber the land and ensure long-term preservation. The most
common tool in use is the conservation easement.
A conservation easement is a nonpossessory interest in land
(meaning that the person who holds the conservation easement
does not actually have the right to occupy or possess the land) that
restricts the landowner's otherwise permissible behavior with the
245
goal of yielding a conservation benefit. The holder of the right is
the entity that has the ability to enforce the agreement and by
state law must be either a qualifying governmental entity or an
NGO. 24 6 The NGOs that work with this tool are called land trusts
2 47
and there are around 1,700 of them across the United States.
Conservation easements encumber over 40 million acres in the
United States, and their use continues to grow. 2 4 8
Conservation easements as a tool are both a boon and a
burden for adaptation efforts. Where conservation easements have
prevented hardscape development, they secure space for
environmental adaptation and enhance resilience. 249 For example,
Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, An Introduction to Conservation
245.
Easements in the United States: A Simple Concept and a Complicated Mosaic of Law, 1 J.L.
PROP. & SOc'Y 107, 111 (2015).
246. Adina M. Merenlender, Lynn Huntsinger, Greig Guthey & Sally K. Fairfax, Land
Trusts and Conservation Easements: Who Is Conserving What for Whom?, 18
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 65, 67-69 (2004).
Every five years, the Land Trust Alliance performs a census-collecting
247.
information about land trusts and their activities. The 2010 census stated that there are
around 1,700 land trusts in the United States. About Us: National Land Trust Census,
LAND TR. ALL., http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about/national-land-trust-census [https://
perma.cc/VGE3-9WWS] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) (click "Download the data tables
comparing National Land Trust Census results from 2005, 2010 and 2015"); Why Conserve
Land, LAND TR. ALL., https://www.landtrustalliance.org/why-conserve-land/how-it-works/p
rotected-forever [https://perma.cc/A5Y3-CU68] (last visited Sept. 28, 2020). In 2015, over
1,300 land trusts existed in the United States. About Us: National Land Trust Census,
supra. Over 1,000 land trusts are a member of the Land Trust Alliance. Members and
Affiliates, LAND TR. ALL., https://www.landtrustalliance.org/membership/become-land-trus
t-member [https://perma.cc/FGV5-6ZM6] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). Over 400 land trusts
were accredited as of August 2020. Accredited Land Trust Statistics, LAND TR.
ACCREDITATION COMM'N, https://www.landtrustaccreditation.orglabout/accredited-land-tr
ust-statistics [https://perma.cc/K8AK-WENA] (last Oct. 9, 2020).
There is no comprehensive database of conservation easements in the United
248.
States, although the National Conservation Easement Database is trying to serve that
function. As of October 2020, it contained data about nearly 32 million acres of conservation
easements but also admits that its database is not complete. NAT'L CONSERVATION
EASEMENT DATABASE, https://www.conservationeasement.us/ [https://perma.cc/W4XF-L39
F] (last visited Sept. 28, 2020).
David G. Hole, Brian Huntley, Julius Arinaitwe, Stuart H.M. Butchart, Yvonne
249.
C. Collingham, Lincoln D.C. Fishpool, Deborah J. Pain & Stephen G. Willis, Toward a
Management Frameworkfor Networks of ProtectedAreas in the Faceof Climate Change, 25
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 305, 312-13 (2011).
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conservation easements could protect riparian land, leaving room
for rivers to flood their banks periodically without risk of harming
infrastructure or human habitation. 250 There can be space for
nonhuman migrations as plants and animals need to move to more
amenable climatic conditions. At the same time, however, these
landscapes are encumbered with stringent restrictions that
challenge the ability to use the land for new purposes. 25 1
The typical conservation easement is a perpetual restriction
on land use. Indeed, three states (California, Hawaii, and Florida)
require them to be perpetual, one state (North Dakota) prohibits
it, and most other states assume perpetuity when not explicitly
stated otherwise in the agreement. 25 2 The perpetual nature of the
agreements creates uncertainty regarding the potential for
modifying the arrangements. In some jurisdictions, courts and
legislatures seem to acknowledge a possibility that changes of
surrounding conditions could lead to modification of a
conservation easement. 25 3 However, other areas may take a hard
line view and be quite reluctant to find that anything really
justifies modification or termination of the agreement. 254 With a
relatively short history of using conservation easements in many
states, we have yet to learn how courts will interpret the statutes
(and the agreements themselves) when someone seeks to modify
the rules. In theory, a perpetual agreement should not allow any
amendments or changes. If you can change the terms of the
agreement, is it still perpetual? Arguably, the only allowable
changes should be nonsubstantive.
Because many conservation easements are donated with the
goal of obtaining a charitable tax deduction, 255 the Internal
Revenue Service is probably the entity that has spent the most
250.
Paul J. Ferraro, Conservation Contracting in Heterogeneous Landscapes: An
Application to Watershed Protection with Threshold Constraints, 32 AGRIC. & RES. ECON.
REV. 53, 54-55 (2003).
251.
Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the Climate Change Crossroads, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2011, at 199, 206 (2011); Adena R. Rissman, Jessica Owley, M.
Rebecca Shaw & Barton (Buzz) Thompson, Adapting Conservation Easements to Climate
Change, 8 CONSERVATION LETTERS 68, 71 (2015).

252.
Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation
Easements:PromotingFlexibility for the Futureand Engagingthe Public Land Use Process,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1051 & n.59; Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 245, at 143 n.92.
253.
In re Flood Hazard Area Verification Approval & Freshwater Wetlands Letter of
Interpretation, 2014 WL 2810153, at *15-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 20, 2014).
254.
Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563, 572, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
255.
Jess R. Phelps, Defining the Role of Agriculture in Agricultural Conservation
Easements, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 647, 688 (2018) (profiling this motivation within the
agricultural conservation easement context).
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time thinking about what the contours of conservation easements
should be. The IRS has taken a narrow view of amendment but
does have regulatory language indicating that perpetuity may not

necessarily last forever. 256
To place this tool in a climate migration example, consider a
typical conservation easement. Imagine a 500-acre parcel that has
been in one family for generations. The family mostly uses the land
for recreation. A forested portion is periodically logged. A small
creek flows through the property, with a nearby marsh. There are
two buildings on the property: one house that is the permanent
residence of the parents (now in their 70s) and one that serves as
a vacation home for the grown children. The family has watched
the conversion of nearby land into housing and laments the change
in neighborhood. The parents are also concerned about the estate
tax implications of passing the land to their children and would
not mind taking a present-day tax deduction. They, therefore,
donate a conservation easement to a local land trust over the
entire 500 acres, reserving a building envelope allowing them to
add one more house near the other two. The conservation
easement requires them to otherwise retain the property in its

"relatively natural state." The agreement forbids any changes to
the creek or construction of permanent buildings outside the
building envelope. There is to be no commercial enterprise aside
from periodic logging of the forested portion, which can only be
done in adherence with certified sustainable forest practices. To
qualify for the tax advantages, the conservation easement must be
perpetual.

What are the possibilities for use of this land in a world with
changing landscapes and changing social needs? One concern
deals with how we might change the land ecologically to respond
to the environmental changes (the line prohibiting altering
watercourses might be particularly troublesome), 25 7 but what if we
want to change the restrictions on the land to meet other (arguably
nonecological) societal needs? This conservation easement would
prevent the building of additional housing. It would also prohibit
the use of the land for other public buildings (e.g., a health center).
It is also likely that it could not be used for hardscape
infrastructure. Building a road would not likely be viewed as a
"relatively natural" feature of the landscape. Train tracks,

Morgan Davis, Note, Belk v. Commissioner: Land Substitutions in Conservation
256.
Easements, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1193, 1196-97, 1204 (2014).
Owley, supranote 251, at 203.
257.
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airports, and other uses would likely meet the same resistance.
What could it be used for? Maybe a refugee camp with temporary
structures and tents? It is not clear what a court would think of
that use should someone challenge it. This does not mean that the
land is not producing a public benefit. It could indeed be quite
beneficial for environmental and ecosystem adaptation needs, but
as we enter into perpetual arrangements, we need to think clearly

about what that might mean should our societal conditions
change. Additionally, if we think expansively about needs of a
growing or changing population, we may see that this land could

be used to provide additional hunting land or perhaps foraging
land for animals. The restriction to keep the land in its relatively
natural state creates confusion regarding what level of grazing
might be permitted or possible use of the land for agriculture, but
there is an easier argument for those uses compared to housing or
infrastructure.
In most states, there is a safety valve for escaping from the
onerous restrictions of conservation easements. If the government
determines that the land is needed for something else, it can call
upon the power of eminent domain to acquire the land. 258 Where

land is encumbered with a conservation easement, exercise of
eminent domain might be more complicated. Eminent domain is

always a time-consuming process that can be tricky politically. 25 9
The public outcry against conversion of conservation lands might
be higher than for conversion of other lands particularly for
parcels or landscapes that have become part of the community. 260
Many conservation lands are protected precisely because
community members came together to stop the conversion and
maybe even pooled resources to purchase the conservation
easement.
Even where eminent domain is an option, assessing the fair
market value of the land and the conservation easement might be

258.
Korngold, supranote 252, at 1081-82.
259.
Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected PoliticalEconomy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101, 110, 130 (2006); Carolyn Thompson, Discourses of Community
Contestation:The Fight over the Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn, New York, 32 URB. GEOGRAPHY
1189, 1195, 1197 (2011); Charles V. Bagli, Ruling Lets Atlantic Yards Seize Land, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/nyregion/25yards.html [https:/
/perma.cc/CL3M-6LH3].
260.
Robert H. Levin, When Forever Proves Fleeting: The Condemnation and
Conversionof ConservationLand, 9 N.Y.U. ENV'T L.J. 592, 599-601 (2000).
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tricky. 26 ' The public entity could be condemning the whole parcel
and then would need to apportion value amongst the various
property interests, or the public entity could potentially just
condemn the conservation easement. Some state laws address this
valuation question and require compensation to the conservation
easement holder of the development value and compensation of
26 2
the remaining value to the landowner.
With conservation easements removed, the rules of the land
will be governed by local zoning rules. While zoning laws were of
course in effect before, one of the hallmarks of conservation
easements is that they represent more stringent and more detailed
restrictions than those entailed in the zoning law. While it is
possible for conservation easements to merely mimic existing land
conservation laws, such an arrangement would be unlikely. First,
it may not seem worth the investment by the holder to negotiate a
conservation easement with such little reward. Second, it may not
be deemed as worthy of a tax deduction by the IRS. However, local
political climates and zoning laws are usually more changeable
than conservation easements and duplicating legal restrictions
would give an additional private enforcement hook. In some
jurisdictions, restraints on eminent domain law may add other
complications. In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo
v. City of New London,2 63 many states passed statutes or amended
26 4
their state constitution to limit the use of eminent domain.
Some attorneys and land trusts have been thinking more
proactively about climate change than other organizations. For the
most part, however, their consideration of climate change has
centered on the environmental conditions of the landscape. Few
have contemplated the social conditions and concerns. At the
annual meeting of the Land Trust Alliance in 2010, conservation
easement attorney James L. Olmsted from Oregon presented some
concerns land trusts should be having about climate change along

Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the
261.
Public Interest and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1897, 1937-38
(2008).
Unclear is what happens over time if these values change? What if the
262.
development value was once low and is now high? Generally, we assume that would be the
direction of the valuation and this high cost might be an additional deterrent to using
eminent domain. What if it goes the other way and becomes cheap to terminate
conservation easements? In such cases, we may see conservation easements terminated too
easily.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
263.
Edward J. Lopez, R. Todd Jewell & Noel D. Campbell, Passa Law, Any Law, Fast!
264.
State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 101, 106 (2009).
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with some sample terms that such organizations might consider
including in their conservation easements. 2 65 Most people were
surprised that he had explicit language addressing climate change
refugees. He included sample clauses to prevent firewood
collection, foraging, and hunting.266 He suggested language that
would prevent conversion of the land to agricultural use even in
times of food shortage. 267 He did suggest that where land was
needed for shelter, the conservation easement should be
accommodated to allow such use. His conservation easement
terms were sample language. Olmsted and other conservation
easement attorneys would likely quickly point out that the exact
terms should be decided by the parties entering into the
agreement. Sample terms or clauses are there to start
conversations, not end them. His term on climate migrants reads
as follows:
Grantor and Grantee agree and acknowledge that global
warming and/or climate change-forced human migrations
may result in displaced persons seeking to reside on eased
properties. In such instances, the residence on the eased
property by new inhabitants will almost certainly conflict
with the conservation values and purposes of the Easement.
In such extreme circumstances, Grantor and Grantee agree
that the conservation values and purposes shall become
secondary to the provision of life sustaining food and shelter
to the new human inhabitants. Accordingly, under such
circumstances they shall seek judicial termination of the
Easement on the grounds that it is no longer practical. The
proceeds of any such termination shall go to Grantee to be
used to deploy conservation
easements protecting
conservation purposes such as those originally protected by
the terminated Easement. 26 8

This language allows for accommodation in "extreme
circumstances" without defining what that might mean.
Many in the audience felt that this was a far-fetched idea and
overly alarmist. However, the president of a land trust in a
southern coastal state urged everyone to take Olmsted's language

265.
James L. Olmsted, Handout at Presentation, Provisionsfor Global Warming Era
Conservation Easements, Land Trust Alliance Rally (Hartford, CT) (Oct. 4, 2010).
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Id.
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and concerns seriously. 269 Without a database of conservation
easements available, it is impossible to examine the existing
encumbrances to see how many people may have incorporated
Olmsted's language or addressed the issue.
V. POTENTIAL POLICY ACTIONS

The role of this Article is not to advocate for the opening of
conservation land to settlement or conversion to infrastructure
projects. Indeed, protection of these landscapes is important.
However, individual landowners and conservation organizations
are making decisions regarding the landscape-perpetual
decisions-without understanding the full implications of not only
changing environmental conditions but changing social conditions
as well. Failure to plan for climate migration will not stop people
and things from moving, but it may lead to less desirable
development patterns.
As we place permanent encumbrances on the land, we should
contemplate what types of changes we think will benefit the
public. Things we should consider:
climate change in our
* Explicitly acknowledging
conservation easements and spelling out what the parties to
the agreement would view as acceptable changes to the land
and land use. This could include, shifting locations of natural
and built areas on a parcel, allowing changes to working
landscapes, increasing public access for hunting and/or
foraging.
* State legislatures should address climate change in state
conservation
State
easement statutes.
conservation
easement statutes limit the use of the tool for conservation
purposes and then generally present a list of acceptable
conservation purposes. These purposes tend to protect land
for open space, environmental conservation, and agriculture
270
Is there
with a focus on keeping land in its natural state.
room for conservation in advance of climatic changes? Can

In later communications with the Author, this conservationist pointed to the
269.
attractiveness of conservation land to refugees providing the example of people fleeing from
hurricane Katrina. He was concerned about potential squatters on conservation land, but
also suggested that there could be language agreeing not to use deadly force against
trespassers. Of course, one should not need a private land agreement to prevent use of
deadly force, but land conflicts have often led to violent responses, particularly in southern
states with stand-your-ground laws.
Robert B. Jackson, Jessica Owley & James Salzman, Mineral Estate Conservation
270.
Easements: A New Policy Instrument to Address Hydraulic Fracturing and Resource
Extraction, 47 ENV'T L. REP. 10112, 10115-16 (2017).
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we use conservation easements to save space for change?
States might also want to address explicitly when
amendment in response to climate change should be allowed
and what form it should take. Should amendment provisions
really defeat conservation easement enforceability?
* Congress should consider the potential public benefit of
changing land uses as climate change adaptation measures.
I am uncertain in general about the use of tax deductions for
conservation easements, but if we do believe that
conservation measures merit a tax benefit, we shouldn't
defeat that benefit by enabling changes in response to public
needs.
Whether thinking about public or private conservation lands

though, a key element for addressing the changing needs of the
public in response to climate change is to incorporate climate

change scenarios into the land-use planning framework and land
management programs. While public entities (and even NGO land
trusts) are considering some climate change models, the focus
tends to be on the ecological and not the social implications of the
changing world. Where governments explicitly eliminate
consideration of climate change impacts, the struggle will be more
pronounced.

One clear lesson we have from climate change is that, while
we know it is coming, we are not very good at predicting exactly
what form it will take and when. Moreover, the effects are not

continuous. Different locations will feel the impacts of climate
change differently. Impose on top of this varied mosaic open space
lands with differing restrictions and rules. Together, this tells us

that we cannot make a one-size-fits-all plan to address these
problems. It will always be context specific. It will involve
considering the needs of the individuals and nonhuman actors

involved. While we cannot issue a directive today that will address
this tension, we can work towards recognizing the interplay
between this tension and the uncertainty in the system and think

about what mechanisms or approaches might facilitate adaptation
in healthy and productive ways.

We often hear people describe climate change as a noanalogue state. In so doing, they are generally referring to the

ecological system. There are many uncertainties as to the exact
impacts on climate change on geochemical cycles, ocean currents,

and species migrations. But this idea of a no-analogue future also
describes the political implications of climate change. Our
governments have never had to deal with a problem on this scale-
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one that interacts with and permeates through every aspect of law
and policy. The COVID-19 pandemic can offer us a model of the
chaos and controversy that is likely to ensue. Yet, the science of
the pandemic is arguably a narrower and better-understood event.
Climate change effects will be more varied and without a vaccine
to counteract them. And we simply do not know how our political
and economic systems will react. This makes it hard to develop
policy mechanisms. What we can see so far from the initial
movements and conflicts that have arisen is that we need flexible
and resilient tools. In the United States, those are not labels we
can give to our land protection strategies for the most part.
Migration can actually be a successful and peaceful method of
climate change adaptation if it occurs in the context of smart policy
that plans for and accommodates such moves. Prohibitions on
migration and other adaptation measures will not be successful.
Climate change is not going to listen to policy mandates and
adaptation must occur in some form. Where it is not allowed to
flexibly occur, conflicts and violence are more likely. We need
strategies at multiple scales (local and national, for example) to be
successful. We need policies that foster flexibility in resource use
and allocations. We need strong local institutions. The time has
come for communities to plan for the inevitable departures and
arrivals.

